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I. INTRODUCTION
A. An Overture to the Reader
Long-arm statutes have been around since the pioneering Illinois
long-arm statute,1 the first effort to codify International Shoe Co. v.
Washington2 through the use of general categories under which a
nonresident was subject to personal jurisdiction. However, the world of
communications and business—two of the cornerstones on which longarms evolved out of International Shoe—has changed substantially since
1955, when Illinois adopted its long-arm statute.
It has been nearly twenty years since the United States Supreme
Court last addressed the constitutional limitations on long-arm
jurisdiction in civil cases. In that interim, long-arm jurisdiction doctrine
has been challenged in several new ways, and International Shoe, the
foundation of long-arm jurisdiction theory, has turned sixty years old.
But rather than be destined for retirement, this sexagenarian remains in
the bloom of youth, still awaiting its full maturation.
The two-decade lacuna in United States Supreme Court precedent
has left long-arm jurisdictional law in considerable disarray. This
disarray is partly the result of judicial and scholarly misunderstandings of
Chief Justice Stone’s International Shoe opinion, whose highly
structured analytic template courts and many scholars have failed to
discern adequately. This disarray is also partly the result of challenges
that modern economy and technology have created, but which the
existing case and statutory law are not fully equipped to meet. These
challenges result in part from the exponential increase in interstate and
globalized commercial deals, consumer transactions, and cross-border
torts–all occurring in the background of worldwide, instantaneous access
made possible by the Internet.
This article presents a case study of the long-arm statute in one of
the country’s fast-growing, globalized commercial centers, Georgia, with
the objective of bringing coherence to an area noted most for its
incoherence. The Georgia statute is similar to New York’s long-arm
statute, which, like the statutes of many other states, purported to limit
1
2

1955 Ill. Laws 2283, § 1.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the reach of extraterritorial service of process by employing the
narrowing device of defining categories of contacts and their
relationships to causes of action. The Georgia experience, like that of
many other states, is that the comfort legislators found forty years ago in
the categorical approach has been undone not only by rapid changes in
the nature and extent of inter-state and international litigation, but also by
judicial interpretations of the statutes themselves.
The authors believe that the sixtieth anniversary of International
Shoe should direct us to return to the fundamentals, so elegantly and
foresightfully expressed in Chief Justice Stone’s succinct opinion. By
returning to those fundamentals, we construct an analytic model for
analyzing long-arm jurisdiction cases. Based on that model, we propose
reform—a model long-arm statute based on the factors used in
International Shoe: quality and quantity of contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum, and the connectivity of the cause of
action to those specific contacts. We use that model long-arm statute to
critique contemporary court decisions and explore how such cases could
be more coherently decided in accordance both with constitutional
limitations on the extraterritorial exercise of judicial power and with the
needs of a twenty-first century business environment.
Our article will appeal both to the theorist—especially those who
seek a reconceptualization of long-received doctrine based on a longoverdue critical dissection—as well as to the practicing attorney who
seeks a new structure for framing long-arm jurisdictional arguments to
meet the demands of the twenty-first century cases s/he is now litigating.
B. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Ahead
The time, therefore, has come to take stock in a way other scholars
have not. We propose to explore in detail, from the novel perspective
articulated in the “Overture,” a series of recurrent, pragmatic questions
that arise about long-arm jurisdiction. Do the long-arms produce
outcomes true to the International Shoe mandates? And, what about the
Illinois, categorical model—has it proven effective in practice? Does it
produce consistent judicial outcomes? Is the California due-processlimits model preferable? Or, finally, is there another approach altogether,
one consonant for the twenty-first century realities?
In Section II, this article will show that the categorical long-arm
statutes do not square with states’ desire to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents to the limits of due process. The article will then
discuss the resulting inconsistency due to the inherent conflict between
the categorical long-arm statutes that, as written, are narrower than the
limits of due process, and the states’ intent in enacting their long-arm
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statutes that they reach to the limits of due process. These two premises
will then be illustrated by a case study of Georgia’s long-arm statute.
Georgia’s long-arm statute is used because it is fairly representative of
the many state long-arms that take a categorical approach to exercising
personal jurisdiction,3 and because Georgia’s rapid growth and
modernization over the decades since its long-arm was enacted4 make it
an ideal laboratory to study the issues involved with the categorical longarms and why changes are necessary to make them more user-friendly
for practitioners and judges.
After showing the shortfalls of the categorical long-arm statutes
through the case study untaken in Section II, this article accomplishes a
visual reconceptualization of long-arm statutes in Section III. This then
leads to a model long-arm statute proposal in Section IV. Rather than
merely use an unguided “limits of due process” statute such as the
California long-arm statute,5 this proposed long-arm statute, founded on
the visual reconceptualization of Section III, enables predictable and
consistent application through specific guidance based on the actual
factors and predicted outcome rules of International Shoe.
Finally, in Section V, the proposed model long-arm statute is
applied to cases from Georgia that were decided under its traditional
long-arm statute to illustrate how the proposed model statute will work in
practice to provide predictable and consistent results.
II. WHY CHANGE IS NECESSARY: AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY OF
GEORGIA’S LONG-ARM STATUTE
This section begins with a discussion of two primary reasons for
why a conceptual change in long-arm statutes is needed: (1) states want
to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process, and (2)
practitioners and judges need a more predictable and consistent long-arm
statute with guidance that allows for such results. This leads to a
discussion of Georgia’s long-arm statute that illustrates the problems of
unpredictable and inconsistent results associated with categorical longarm statutes. These problems are caused by the conflict between the
3

Forty-four states enacted categorical long-arm statutes. See Douglas D. McFarland,
Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84
B.U. L. REV. 491, 525-530 (2004) [hereinafter McFarland] (breaking down state longarm statutes among those that have been construed to the limits of due process, those that
have not, those where a provision was subsequently added to the statute to extend it to the
limits of due process while retaining the categorical subsections, and those which
subsequently switched completely to a limits-of-due-process statute). Professor
McFarland refers to these long-arm statutes as “enumerated-acts” statutes. Id. at 497.
4
Georgia’s long-arm statute was enacted in 1966. 1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1.
5
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 2007).
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state’s desire to obtain personal jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due
process and a long-arm statute, which, as worded, does not actually allow
for personal jurisdiction to be exercised to the due process limits.
Although this discussion is addressed to categorical long-arm statutes,
those states with statutes which authorize jurisdiction to due process
limits would benefit from a system that provides guidance for consistent
and predictable application for a variety of reasons also addressed below.
A. Two Primary Reasons Why Change is Necessary
1. States Want to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction to Due Process
Limits
State policymakers in general believe their citizens should be able
to seek redress within their own state to the greatest extent possible for
any claims arising against a nonresident. This can be seen by the fact that
many states when enacting their long-arm statutes believed they were
allowing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to due process limits.
For example, the first long-arm statute after International Shoe, enacted
in Illinois in 1955 and the template for many other states’ long-arm
statutes, “was designed to extend the reach of Illinois state-court
jurisdiction to the limits permitted by International Shoe.”6 While the
early long-arm statutes did not actually extend to the limits of due
process, this was more a result of the uncertainty of those limits. The
trend of the states is unquestionably towards construing and/or changing
the long-arm statutes to reach to the limits of due process, thus showing
the desire of most states to have personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
coterminous with due process.7
6

LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 217 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter TEPLY & WHITTEN] (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the authors cite an
Illinois Supreme Court case, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Mosele, 368 N.E.2d 88, 91 (1977),
where the court recognized that “Illinois expanded the in personam jurisdiction of its
courts to what was in 1955 understood to be the limits permitted under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” TEPLY & WHITTEN at 217 n.215. But see
McFarland, supra note 3, at 502 (arguing “that is not what the drafters of the long-arm
statute intended.” (footnote omitted)). Professor McFarland also argues that two other
early long-arm statutes, Wisconsin’s and the Uniform Long-Arm Act were not intended
to reach the limits of due process. Id. at 508-11. But his reasoning, that these early longarm statutes were merely intended “to grant only long-arm jurisdiction that the courts
previously approved,” illustrates the fallacy with attempting to codify specific categories
of long-arm jurisdiction. Id. at 510. The ideal type of long-arm statute should not just be
an unguided “limits of due process” statute, but should lay out guidelines that allow for
fair, consistent, and predictable results in determining whether a particular factual
scenario allows for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
7
Of the forty-four states that enacted categorical long-arm statutes, nine have since
added “catch-all” provisions that extend their statute to the limits of due process while
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In fact, the basis for many of the conflicts with the application of
the long-arm statutes is that state legislatures enacted them with the
belief that they were allowing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to
the limits of due process. However, the statutes actually did not do so.
This became apparent as the scope of the limits of due process was
recognized to be broader than state policy makers had originally thought
through the United States Supreme Court’s setting of the boundaries in
cases subsequent to International Shoe and as commentators expounded
on the limits of due process based on those cases. Both because the
categorical long-arm statutes were enacted at a time when the full limits
of due process as allowed by International Shoe was not fully understood
(or developed), and because of subsequent understanding of the more
expanded scope of the limits of due process, these statutes have become
outdated. The courts were setting the limits of personal jurisdiction caseby-case and expanding the limits as new situations arose. State
legislatures’ codifying what the courts had already decided tended to
freeze in place the approved categories and did not allow the courts to
continue to define the limits as their contours became clear in modernscenario cases that arose after International Shoe. Instead of freezing in
place the already approved categories, a long-arm statute that allows for
expansion to new circumstances as they arise would be more beneficial.
By contrast, the open-ended California-style of long-arm statute allows
for continued development of the law in response to diverse, new factual
situations. Yet, it encourages a judicial “grab” for the expansion of longarm jurisdiction (as the California courts did, e.g., in the Asahi Metals
case) with no structured legislative guidance. The absence of legislative
guidance gives cases decided under “due-process-limits” long-arm
statutes a pronounced ad-hoc aura–which is accurate, because such
unguided common law-decision making leads to scattered, less
predictable and sometimes incoherent results.8
retaining the previous categories as well (Alabama, Alaska, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Nebraska, Oregon, South Dakota, and Tennessee) and five have changed to due process
limits language exclusively (Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Nevada, and Oklahoma).
McFarland, supra note 3, at 525-31. Of the thirty remaining states that have categoricalonly long-arm statutes, twelve interpret their statute to reach to the limits of due process
(Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Washington), which leaves only eighteen
states that continue to adhere to the categorical approach (Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin). Id.
8
For an example of how rule development can lead to inconsistent, vague, and
indeterminate articulations of law even in the hands of some of the most skilled and
learned common-law judges, see the slip opinions on the basic law of the tort of nuisance

2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century

347

In addition to wanting such long-arm statutes, states need them in
order to protect their residents and allow them to seek redress against
nonresidents who do them harm. The Illinois Supreme Court best
expressed this need in Nelson v. Miller,9 the first case in which that court
interpreted Illinois’ long-arm statute; “[t]he foundations of jurisdiction
include the interest that a State has in providing redress in its own courts
against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations
to, those within the ambit of the State’s legitimate protective policy.”10
Such a long-arm statute can also create a better environment for
businesses (especially smaller businesses) in the state as they tend to
minimize costs from having to pursue out-of-state legal actions that
could otherwise be pursued within the state.
Furthermore, the artificial nature of the categorical approach leads
to missed opportunities (and unfair results) where personal jurisdiction
was pleaded but not upheld under one specific category, yet might have
been under another category that was not pleaded. This occurred in
Designs Unlimited, Inc. v. Rodriguez,11 where the trial court determined
that the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction under one
subsection (or category) of Georgia’s long-arm statute (the “transacts any
business” category).12 On appeal, Designs Unlimited argued that the trial
court erred because the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction
under another subsection (the “tortious act” category).13 The appellate
court affirmed the dismissal, because the plaintiffs had not raised the
issue of that subsection with the trial court.14 Thus, due to the artificial
nature of a categorical statute, the plaintiff lost an opportunity to seek
redress in its own state court. This categorical nature is analogous to the
in Bamford v. Turnley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Exch. Ch. 1862). Bamford is particularly
notable in Chief Justice Williams admission that the rapidity of growth in new factual
scenarios as commerce and industry expanded challenged the courts’ ability to adapt the
law coherently to controversies arising from those new developments.
9
143 N.E.2d 673 (Ill. 1957).
10
Id. at 676. Furthermore, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held that ‘[a] State
generally has a ‘manifest interest’ in providing its residents with a convenient forum for
redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors,’ particularly when these actors
‘purposefully derive benefit from their interstate activities.” First Nat’l Bank Of Ames,
Iowa v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005) (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473(II)(A) (1985)).”
11
601 S.E.2d 381 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
12
Id. at 381.
13
Id.
14
Id. “Since Designs Unlimited failed to raise this argument below and the trial
court’s ruling was accordingly limited to only whether Rodriguez was subject to
jurisdiction pursuant to [GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-91(1), Designs Unlimited has waived
any argument relating to its asserted enumeration.”
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writ and code pleading of bygone days.15 And just as those artificial
categories of writs and code pleading have given way to notice pleading
guided by the federal and state rules of civil procedure, the artificial
categories under which personal jurisdiction may be allowed should give
way to a due-process-limits statute which incorporates guidance
reflecting the actual factors and predicted outcome rules of International
Shoe. A proposed model long-arm statute that does just that is discussed,
infra, in Section IV.
2. Practitioners and Judges Should Have a Long-Arm Statute that
Allows for Predictable and Consistent Application
The second reason a conceptual change in long-arm statutes is
needed is more of a pragmatic matter than a question of politics and
policy. Lawyers, judges, and people generally that those who use the
long-arm statute in practice need one that, while allowing for personal
jurisdiction to the limits of due process, gives guidance to allow for an
application that is predictable and consistent. As discussed above many
states have construed their statutes to extend to the limits of due process.
Some, though, while stating that their policy is to construe the statute to
the limits of dues process, have in application not done so, due to a literal
reading of the long-arm statute and early misconceptions on the limit of
due process. The result has been inconsistent decisions that appear to
define the scope of long-arm jurisdiction differently under the same
statute. An atypical inconsistency involves the tortious act and injury
subsections, where the Georgia Supreme Court initially took an
expansive view of “tortious act” and later a narrower view, followed by
the federal courts (in diversity-of-citizenship cases) taking a very
expansive view of the scope of long-arm jurisdiction under the state
categorical statute.16 These inconsistent results are discussed next.

15
For a brief discussion of writ and code pleading and the problems that system
created, see JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 5.4, 250 (3d ed. West 1999).
16
See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
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B. A Case Study of Georgia’s Categorical Long-Arm Statute
A study of Georgia’s long-arm statute17 illustrates the inconsistency
and unpredictability that result from the inherent conflict in a categorical
long-arm statute that does not, as written, provide personal jurisdiction to
the limits of dues process despite the state legislature’s intent that the
long-arm extend personal jurisdiction as far as possible. This section will
detail this tension and resulting application issues. In doing so, it will
first describe how the statute as worded does not provide for due process
limits. Next, it will show how the history of amendments to the long-arm
statute reflects the Georgia legislature’s desire to exercise jurisdiction to
the limits of due process. Following that will be a description of the
resulting inconsistent application of the long-arm statute by the Georgia
courts due to this conflict – focusing primarily on the “transacts any
business”, “tortious act”, and “tortious injury” subsections, and
highlighting a specific example in Georgia’s long-arm statute of the
problems caused by the codification of what is thought to be the limits of
due process–the defamation exception of subsection (2) that prohibits
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in actions for libel or slander. Finally,
the shortfall in the categorical approach will be delineated as classes of
lawsuits have developed that were not anticipated in the 1950s and 1960s
when categorical long-arm statutes were drafted–focusing on how new
technologies and commercial practices, specifically Internet commerce,
pose new personal jurisdiction problems for individuals and corporations
who are harmed through this medium.
17

The statute reads:
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident
or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising from any of
the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code
section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person
or through an agent, he:
(1) Transacts any business within this state;
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as to a cause
of action for defamation of character arising from the act;
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or omission
outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state; or
(5) With respect to proceedings for alimony, child support, or division of
property in connection with an action for divorce or with respect to an
independent action for support of dependents, maintains a matrimonial
domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if
the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the
action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph shall not
change the residency requirement for filing an action for divorce.
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004).
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1. How the Statute as Worded Does Not Provide Due Process
Limits
A literal reading of the Georgia long-arm statute shows that it is not
coextensive with the limits of due process in at least two areas. First, the
preamble states that a “court of this state may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . as to a cause of action arising from
any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in
this Code section.”18 The arising from language, of course, limits the
statute to specific personal jurisdiction.19 Then, the designation of
18

§ 9-10-91.
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 420
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process does not require that the cause of
action “arise out of” but rather, and more expansively in the jurisdictional sense, merely
“be related to” the nonresident defendant’s forum contacts). However, despite the
limitation of the long-arm to specific jurisdiction, an alternative method is available that
in effect allows for general jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Because the definition
of “nonresident” as it pertains to the long-arm statute does not include foreign
corporations which are authorized to do or transact business in the state, then by negative
implication those foreign corporations that are authorized to transact business in Georgia
have been held to be “residents” for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 864-865 (Ga. 1992).
Under the long-arm statute, a nonresident is “a corporation which is not organized
or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or transact business in
this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section 9-10-91 arises.” GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (West 2004) (emphasis added). The Georgia Supreme Court has
not overlooked the significance of the language:
It is apparent from the language of this definition that a corporation which is
“authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim” arises
is a “resident” for purposes of personal jurisdiction over that corporation in
an action filed in the courts of this state. As a resident, such a foreign
corporation may sue or be sued to the same extent as a domestic
corporation. Therefore, a plaintiff wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation
authorized to do business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal
jurisdiction parameters of § 9-10-91, including the requirement that a cause
of action arise out of a defendant’s activities within the state.
Allstate Ins. Co., 422 S.E.2d at 865. It is questionable, however, to assume that when a
foreign corporation does not meet the definition of nonresident, it must ipso-facto be
deemed a resident foreign corporation upon which service can be made as with any other
resident. The Georgia Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of the
definition of nonresident in the long-arm statute, stating that “it appears that the definition
does not run afoul of the ‘minimum contacts’ requirement of procedural due process.” Id.
at 865, n.3. Yet, without a due-process-minimum-contacts analysis, a finding of general
jurisdiction could potentially exceed the scope of due process. For example, if a foreign
corporation registers to do business in Georgia, because it is anticipating conducting
business operations there, it may not have the continuous and systematic contacts
required for Quadrant III general jurisdiction (See the discussion in Section III, infra, for
the reconceptualization of International Shoe’s jurisdictional rules into a Cartesiancoordinate-plane metaphor.) But, by virtue of registering in the state, that corporation can
nonetheless be subject to service of process on a cause of action unrelated to any
activities within the state, even though those activities are insufficient to sustain general
19
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categories further limits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to less than
the limits of due process. Subsections (2) and (3), when read as the
Legislature enacted them, further constrain the exercise of personnel
jurisdiction within the already constrained scope of specific jurisdiction
laid out in the preamble. Subsection (2) applies only where a nonresident
commits a tortious act within the state. It is further limited by an explicit
exclusion of defamation causes of action.20 Subsection (3), allows for
jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes injury in the state by an act
outside the state. Yet it is then limited by requiring nonresidents to have
significant contacts with the state to be amenable to personal jurisdiction.
And subsection (1), which reads broadly (but still constrained by the
preamble’s limits of specific personal jurisdiction), had early on been
narrowed in application boldly by the Georgia Supreme Court in a
somewhat cabined gloss of the quality of the contacts that the
nonresident defendant needed to have with the state, and also by the
federal court interpretation that it applies to contract actions only.21 The

jurisdiction. A strained fiction of “consent” to general jurisdiction might be advanced, yet
such a broad consent as a consequence of a narrow registry law hardly seems any longer
reasonable or plausible, if it ever was so, in the era of globalization and e-commerce.
From a more doctrinal viewpoint, the constitutionality of such “doing business”
statutes was discussed by Professors Teply and Whitten when analyzing the splintered
opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990), which unanimously upheld the constitutionality of exercising personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who is served with process while temporarily within the
state. TEPLY AND WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 212-16, 219-20. In upholding its
constitutionality, however, the justices were divided as to the reasons: the four justice
plurality held that the minimum contacts test does not apply to traditionally accepted
methods of obtaining jurisdiction – those that were available when the Due Process
Clause was adopted and are still in use; one justice wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment
gave the Court authority to examine even traditional methods for validity; and four
justices stated that the minimum contacts test should be applied to every case. TEPLY AND
WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 213-14. Thus, it appears that the “doing business” statutes in
Georgia and other states can not be applied independently of a minimum contacts
analysis. See TEPLY AND WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 220 (explaining that when a state
employs a pre-International Shoe method to assert personal jurisdiction, “an alternate
analysis under the minimum contacts test must be employed to determine whether the
assertion of jurisdiction will satisfy that test”).
20
Sections II.B.3.c and II.B.4, infra, discuss the defamation exclusion of subsection
(2).
21
Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147, 152 (N.D. Ga. 1969). See infra
Section II.B.3.a (discussing subsection (1)). This interpretation was apparently not
challenged in subsequent actions in the state appellate courts, since later cases sought
jurisdiction under subsection (1) based on contract causes of action only, until Whitaker
v. Krestmark of Ala., Inc., 278 S.E.2d 116 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981), overruled, Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga.
2005). In Whitaker, the Georgia Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the contract-actiononly interpretation given in Scott, stating that although “such an analysis has never been
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inadequacy of these restrictive glosses in the face of modern business
reality recently compelled the Georgia Supreme Court to overrule them
in Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First National
Bank of Ames. The result, however, is to leave a shifting, and
inconsistent, history of statutes, interpretation, followed by reinterpretation, engraved upon the Georgia long-arm-statue. The
Innovative case may also engender its own problems, for its rejection of
limits other then the bounds of due process does not square with “arising
under” limitation of the statute’s preamble.22
On the other hand, while some of the categories expressed in the
long-arm stature are not coterminous with due process limits (because of
the limitations of subsections (1),23 (2), and (3)), subsections (4) and (5),
do appear to reach to the currently understood limits of due process, even
in the face of the “arising from” language in the statute’s preamble. One
whose only contact with the state is the ownership, use, or possession of
real property (subsection (4))24 would not be amenable to suit for a cause
of action not arising out of that contact under due process limits.
Similarly, a nonresident would not be amenable to suit for an alimony,
child support or modification action (subsection (5))25 where the
nonresident had not lived in the state while married or while becoming
responsible for a child.26 Thus, in any particular case, whether the longarm statute extends to the limits depends on which category a dispute
falls in. And it is certain that the long-arm statute taken as a whole does
not extend to the limits of due process.

expressly enunciated by the courts of this state, it is entirely consistent with the decisions
of this court and of the Supreme Court.” Whitaker, 278 S.E.2d at 118.
22
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005) (rejecting the long-standing judge-made contact and contract
limitations and holding that subsection (1) should be interpreted literally, limited only by
due process, and expressly overruling all prior cases that failed to do so). The
implications of this recent holding are discussed in Sections II.B.3.a–c and II.B.4, infra.
23
Although subsection (1) is now to be interpreted literally, it is still limited to
specific jurisdiction by the “arising from” language. See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
24
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004). While the new broad interpretation of
subsection (1) does not make subsection (4) completely superfluous, there is certainly
considerable overlap between the two subsections now, because most disputes related to
real estate are based on the transaction of business within the state.
25
§ 9-10-91.
26
The Georgia Supreme Court appeared implicitly to recognize that subsection (5)
reaches the limits of due process, when, in an action for modification of child support, the
court employed a due process analysis only, not mentioning the long-arm statute in
upholding personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Chung-A-On v. Drury, 580 S.E.2d
229 (Ga. 2003).
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2. History of Long-Arm Statute Amendments Shows Desire by
Georgia Legislature to Exercise Jurisdiction to Limits of Due
Process
Like cleaning away eons of soot from the bright colors of
Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel frescos, we now look to see the clarity of
legislative intent that became obscured by layers of judicial gloss applied
over five decades. The amendments made to the original long-arm
statute27 throughout the years show an effort by Georgia’s legislature to
provide for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum
extent tolerated by due process. One obvious motivation for legislative
tinkering with the Georgia long-arm statute is that the limits of federal
due process, as construed by United States Supreme Court decisions,
were found to be broader than what was commonly understood by
lawyers and legislators at the time of categorical long-arm’s first iteration
in Illinois, which Georgia subsequently embraced in enacting that pattern
statute a decade later.28
The Georgia legislature’s intent was tested early when an
interpretation problem with the long-arm statute occurred shortly after its
1966 enactment. A federal district court held that the statute did not
apply to nonresident corporations, because the language refers to a
“nonresident or his executor or administrator.”29 Since only natural
27

1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1. The statute originally only had three categories and did
not have a definition for nonresident. The original subsections (a), (b), and (c) correspond
to the current subsections (1), (2), and (4). For those subsections, see supra note 17. The
subsections will be referred to by their current designation. A separate section was added
that defines nonresident, which is currently GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (see infra notes 2931 and accompanying text).
28
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzeiwicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (non-resident
franchisee amenable to personal jurisdiction in breach of contract action based on
franchisee’s deliberately reaching out to franchisor and entering into a carefully
structured long-term agreement, despite having not physically entered the state); McGee
v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (non-resident insurance company amenable to
personal jurisdiction in breach of contract action based on single insurance contract with
resident of state, because insurer had substantial contact with state through the policy).
Cases where state Supreme Courts recognized the expanding limits include: Keefe v.
Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1273 (Colo. 2002) (upholding
personal jurisdiction over non-resident law firm partly based on its earlier cases which
had taken an expansive view of due process limits and stating that the “subsequent
jurisprudence of the [U.S.] Supreme Court has confirmed rather than brought into
question the reliability of those outcomes . . . .”); Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Ill. 1961) (noting that since International Shoe “the
requirements for [personal] jurisdiction have been further relaxed”); Beck v. Spindler, 99
N.W.2d 670, 675 (Minn. 1959) (stating in breach of contract action that “the trend toward
greater liberality in permitting state courts to take jurisdiction in this type of case
continues. And well it should.”).
In fact, the Illinois statute itself was the product of cobbling together outcomes in a
variety of earlier cases: according to the research of the authors of Dictum Run Wild,
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persons have an executor or administrator, the court reasoned that the
long-arm statute does not apply to corporations30 Because such a
limitation would significantly undermine the efficiency of the long-arm
statute in securing remediation for Georgia residents against nonresident
businesses, the Georgia General Assembly wasted little time in
responding to that holding by amending statutory language explicitly to
encompass legal entities in addition to natural persons corporations.31
The next test of the legislature’s intent involved the interpretation
of the “commits a tortious act within this state” portion of subsection
(2).32 In O’Neal Steel Inc. v. Smith, Smith brought a tort action against
O’Neal Steel after he was injured in Georgia while unloading “H” beams
when a metal clamp holding the beams together broke.33 Because the
beams had been manufactured and packaged by O’Neal Steel in
Alabama, the issue was whether a tortious act had occurred within the
state as called for in subsection (2).34 The court compared the reasoning
of the broader “Illinois Rule”35 and the narrower “New York Rule,”36

supra note 3 at 504, subsection (1) was based on International Shoe and Travelers Health
Association v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643 (1950); subsection (2)
language chosen based on fact that constitutional challenges to nonresident motorist
statutes and single-act tort statutes had been rejected; subsection (3), concerning
ownership of real property, relied partially on similar Pennsylvania statute; and
subsection (4), concerning insurance contracts, relied on fact that similar statutes in other
states had been sustained.
29
Wilen Mfg. Co. v. The Standard Prod. Co., C.A. No. 10532 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
30
Id. This holding was later reversed by the Fifth Circuit, after the amendment had
already been made. Wilen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. The Standard Prod. Co., 409 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.
1969). However, the Fifth Circuit’s holding was undermined later that year when the
Georgia Supreme Court held in another case that the long-arm statute did not apply to
corporations prior to the amendment. Bauer Int’l. Corp. v. Cagle’s, Inc., 171 S.E.2d 314
(Ga. 1969) (holding also that the amendment could not be applied retroactively to a
dispute arising prior to the amendment).
31
1968 Ga. Laws 1419; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-117 (now GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90
(West 2004)). The amendment included in the definition of “nonresident” “a corporation
which is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do
or transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action under Code Section
9-10-91 arises.” GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-90 (West 2004).
32
O’Neal Steel, Inc. v. Smith, 169 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969), remanded on
other grounds, 171 S.E.2d 519 (Ga. 1969), vacated and rev’d on other grounds, 172
S.E.2d 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970).
33
Id. at 828.
34
Id.
35
Derived from Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard, 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), where
the Illinois Supreme Court, in construing the similarly worded subsection of its long-arm
statute, held that the nonresident’s tortious act could not be separated from the accident,
and thus the “tortious action” could be considered to have occurred in Illinois, where the
plaintiff resided and was injured, though the water heater valve at issue was negligently
manufactured in Ohio.
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opting for the latter interpretation.37 “The plain language of our statute
requires that the tortious act be committed within the state . . . . If our
legislature meant something other than what is plainly indicated by the
words used, it could have used language appropriate to indicate a
different intent.” 38 The court pointed out that “our legislature did not
choose to adopt the language of the Uniform Interstate and International
Procedure Act,”39 which contained a subsection providing for tortious
injuries occurring within the state caused by an act outside the state. The
court then invited the legislature to amend the long-arm if it so desired;
“‘Any plea for further expansion of its scope, however desirable such
expansion may seem, is a matter for the legislature rather than the
courts.’”40 The court also pointed out that the New York legislature had
done so after the New York Court of Appeals rejected the “Illinois

36
Derived from Feathers v. McLucas, 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965), where the New
York Court of Appeals held that the tortious act must be physically committed within the
state according to the plain language of its similarly worded subsection.
37
O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 829-30.
38
Id. at 831.
39
Id. See Unif. Interstate & Int’l Procedure Act § 1.03 (1962), 13 U.L.A. 361-62
(1986). The act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1962, seven years after the Illinois long-arm statute, and was adopted by
several states. TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 218. Section 1.03 stated:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising
from the person’s
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state [; or
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting].
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this Section, only a
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this
Section may be asserted against him.
Id. Portions of the Uniform Act were modeled on the Illinois long-arm statute: “The
drafters of the Act identified sections 1.03(a)(1), 1.03(a)(5), and 1.03(a)(6) as ‘derived
from’ or ‘similar to’ the Illinois statute.” McFarland, Dictum Run Wild, supra note 3, at
n.14 (citing Handbook of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Uniform State Laws &
Proceedings, 1962 Nat’l Conf. Comm’n Unif. St. L. 81-82, 222-223). The Uniform Act
“was later withdrawn as obsolete.” McFarland, Dictum Run Wild, supra note 3, at 495
(citing Handbook of the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws &
Proceedings, 1977 Nat’l Conf. Comm’n Unif. St. L. 118).
40
O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 832 (quoting Feathers v. McLucas, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80
(N.Y. 1965)).
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Rule.”41 The Georgia legislature responded within a year; it added the
current subsection (3)42 to the long-arm statute, in yet another
demonstration of its intent to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits
of due process as they were then understood. Subsection (3)’s wording
was virtually identical to the subsection of the Uniform Act quoted by
the O’Neal Steel court.43 At that time, the more stringent contacts
required by the subsection were thought to be necessary under due
process;44 thus, the Georgia legislature expanded the scope to what it
believed were the limits of due process after the narrow interpretation of
subsection (2) by the O’Neal Steel court.45
The legislature again demonstrated its policy to provide for the
maximum ability to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresidents when
it amended the definition of nonresident to encompass those who had
been residents of Georgia at the time the cause of action accrued, but had
subsequently moved from the state. The Georgia courts had determined
that a defendant had to be a nonresident at the time of the occurrence of
the cause of action, and such rulings compelled a legislative response to
protect the due-process limits to the legislation’s purpose. When first
announcing this interpretation, the Georgia Supreme Court observed,
with a tincture of irony, that “[t]he ordinary signification of the term
‘nonresident’ would seem to be mutually exclusive with the ordinary
41

Id. at 832 n.10.
1970 Ga. Laws, p. 443, § 1. Enacted originally as GA. CODE ANN. § 24-113.1(c)
(now GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2006)).
43
O’Neal Steel, 169 S.E.2d at 831 (quoting § 1.03(a)(4) of the Uniform Act, supra
note 37). Cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(3), supra note 17.
44
See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 218-19 (discussing the Uniform Act’s
“tortious injury” subsection and stating: “Obviously, the Act was drafted under the
impression that tortious acts committed outside the state would require greater contact to
satisfy the International Shoe test.”)
45
The Georgia Supreme Court echoed this view, stating that “[s]ubsection ([3]) . . .
was obviously enacted to legislatively ‘get around’ the legal reasoning on which the”
O’Neal Steel decision was based. Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d
399, 400 (Ga. 1973) (adopting the “Illinois Rule” for subsection (2) in cases where the
cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of subsection (3)).
Also noteworthy is that subsection (1), with its “transacts any business” language,
was apparently not considered to be applicable. It would seem that the Legislature had
either agreed with, or at least conceded, the federal court’s interpretation in Scott v.
Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1969), that subsection (1) applied to
contract actions only. Otherwise that subsection could have applied in cases such as
O’Neal Steel, where the nonresident defendant commits a tortious act outside the state
causing injury in the state arising out of its transaction of business within the state–and
subsection (3) would have been unnecessary. Consequently, the Georgia Supreme
Court’s recent pronouncement that subsection (1) is not restricted to contract actions, in
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005), seems to conflict with the Legislature’s understanding of
subsection (1) when it enacted subsection (3).
42
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signification of the word ‘resident.’ The [long-arm] statute in question
clearly does not apply.”46 This interpretation held for several years, until
shortly after the Georgia Court of Appeals’ decision in Smiley v.
Davenport.47 This case involved a malpractice action against a military
doctor who was residing in Georgia at the time the alleged malpractice
occurred in the state.48 The plaintiff had originally obtained personal
jurisdiction over the doctor in her first suit, while the doctor was still
living in the state, but then dismissed her suit without prejudice a few
months after the doctor moved from the state.49 The Plaintiff later refiled
her suit in Georgia and served the doctor in Texas,50 but the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction, because the doctor had been a resident
of Georgia at the time the cause of action occurred.51 Within a year of
this decision, the legislature moved to secure this holding into statutory
law: It enacted the amendment which added to the definition of a
nonresident one who was a resident at the time the cause of action
accrued and subsequently moved from the state.52
The final significant amendment made to Georgia’s long-arm
statute was the addition of subsection (5), sometimes called the
“domestic-relations” long-arm statute.53 Once again, the legislature
responded to a shortfall in the originally-enacted long-arm statute in
order to provide Georgia’s citizens the ability to obtain personal
jurisdiction allowed by the limits of due process. The triggering event
was the Supreme Court of Georgia’s opinion in Warren v. Warren.54 In
46

Thompson v. Abbott, 174 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1970). The Georgia Supreme
Court had also held in a pre-long-arm statute case that Georgia’s Non-Resident Motorist
Act could not be constitutionally applied to one who was a resident at the time of the
accident. Young v. Morrison, 137 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1964) (striking down the Legislature’s
expansion of the Non-Resident Motorist Act to those who had moved from the state
subsequent to an accident). Thus, after these rulings, if a plaintiff was injured in an
automobile accident by a resident who later moved out of the state, personal jurisdiction
could not be obtained over the tortfeasor in Georgia under either statute.
47
229 S.E.2d 489 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
48
Id. at 490.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 492-93.
52
1977 Ga. Laws 586-87; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-117 (Now, GA. CODE ANN § 9-1090). The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the amendment in
Crowder v. Ginn, 286 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1982). In doing so, the Court overruled Young v.
Morrison, 137 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1964), “because Young relied upon the views of the
Supreme Court of the United States expressed in the early case of Pennoyer v. Neff rather
than upon the more modern views of that court set forth in International Shoe.” Crowder,
286 S.E.2d at 706.
53
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(5) (West 2004).
54
287 S.E.2d 524 (Ga. 1982).
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that case, the wife sued her nonresident husband for divorce, alimony,
custody, child support, and to have their separation agreement declared
void.55 She attempted to obtain personal jurisdiction under subsection
(1), but the Court held that the “transacting any business” category did
not apply to matters relating to divorce.56 The court, however strongly
exhorted the legislature to add a domestic relations category to the longarm statute, pointing out that a number of states had done so, but
“[u]nfortunately, Georgia has not.”57 The legislature responded a year
later by adding subsection (5) to the long-arm statute.58
These amendments show a desire to exercise jurisdiction to the
maximum extent possible.59 Significantly, the legislature never amended
the statute to restrict its extraterritorial reach. Nor did the legislature act
to limit any expansive interpretation that the courts had given to the
statute60-indeed, all of the amendments expanded the scope of the statute.
55

Id. at 525.
Id. at 526. The Court did, however, hold that the separation agreement could be
considered the transaction of business, and thus the husband was amenable to personal
jurisdiction under subsection (1) for the separation agreement issue. Id.
57
Id. In a later case, the Court summarized the situation leading to the enactment of
subsection (5):
[I]n Warren v. Warren, we noted with disapproval the fact that other states
had enacted domestic relations Long-Arm Statutes, but our legislature had
failed to do so. Within a year, the General Assembly enacted subsection (5)
of [GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-91, the domestic relations subsection of our
Long-Arm Statute. Subsection (5) was patterned after the Florida statute that
we had studied and approved in Whitaker v. Whitaker, 230 S.E.2d 486 (Ga.
1976)], six years earlier.
Smith v. Smith, 330 S.E.2d 706, 707 (Ga. 1985) (upholding the constitutionality of
subsection (5)).
58
1983 Ga. Laws 1304, § 1.
59
“Both the 1968 and the 1970 Amendments seem clearly to be evidence of the
intent of the Georgia Legislature to expand the statute to the fullest extent possible.”
Griffin v. Air South, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
60
For cases that took an expansive view of the long-arm statute (with no subsequent
legislative action to narrow the scope), see, for example, Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v.
Matthews, 291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding the long-arm statute supports general
jurisdiction and omitting “cause of action arises from” language in its quote of the
statute); Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga 2000) (upholding personal
jurisdiction in defamation suit, reasoning that the defamation exception in long-arm
statute was no longer applicable); Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga.
1968) (adopting the “Illinois Rule” in holding that the “tortious act” subsection (2)
applies to acts committed outside the state which cause injury in state); Regante v.
Reliable-Triple Cee of N. Jersey, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 372 (Ga. 1983) (nonresident assignee
of promissory note for real property with no other ties to the state amenable to personal
jurisdiction under the “ownership of real property” heading in subsection (4) in action
where assignment alleged to be invalid); Schuehler v. Pait, 238 S.E.2d 65 (Ga. 1977)
(reversing trial court and holding that nonresident plaintiff can use the long-arm statute in
action against nonresident defendant); Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 250 S.E.2d 169
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (finding personal jurisdiction under “real property” subsection (4) in
56
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This continuing legislative history of Georgia’s long-arm statute
harmonizes with the history of its model, the Illinois long-arm statute.61
At the time the Georgia legislature enacted its statute, the Illinois
Supreme Court had already stated that the intent of the Illinois legislature
was to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process,62 and
the Illinois legislature responded to any future judicial parsimony by
limiting the boundaries of the statute with quick and decisive
amendments.63
3. The Resulting Inconsistent Application by Georgia Courts Due to
the Conflict
The result of the conflict between the literal reading of the long-arm
statute and the legislative intent has been inconsistent application by the
Georgia courts. One reason for the seemingly contradictory “limits of
due process” claim is the courts’ (and hence the legislature’s) early
beliefs of what were the limits of due process. Although the concept of
specific and general personal jurisdiction was first articulated in 1966,64
this concept was not widely embraced until the United States Supreme
suit on promissory note for purchase of property against original nonresident promisor,
who subsequently sold the property to the corporation which defaulted on the note, and
thus did not own the property when suit commenced).
61
In 1955, the Illinois long-arm statute provided for personal jurisdiction for a cause
of action arising from: “(a) The transaction of any business within this State; (b) The
commission of a tortious act within this State; (c) The ownership, use, or possession of
any real estate situated in this State; (d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk
located within this State at the time of contracting.” 1955 Ill. Laws 2283, § 1. Georgia’s
long-arm statute, when originally enacted, provided three categories: “(a) Transacts any
business within this state; (b) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except
as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or (c) Owns, uses,
or possesses any real property situated within this state.” 1966 Ga. Laws 343, § 1. The
rationale for adding the defamation exclusion (which the Illinois long-arm did not
contain) is discussed, infra, in Section II.B.3.c.
62
“As we observed in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 [(1956)], the
statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent
permitted by the due-process clause.” Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
176 N.E.2d 761, 763 (Ill. 1961). Georgia’s long-arm statute was enacted in 1966.
63
Compare Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E. 2d 1203, 1206-08 (Ill.
1981) (rejecting extension of interpretation of the “tortious act within the state” category
of long-arm jurisdiction to encompass nonresident defendant’s alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty that took place outside of Illinois but allegedly caused a diminution of
funds of a corporation organized or headquartered in Illinois) with Ill. Rev. Stat., ch.110,
2-209 (a)(7), (11), & (12) (1989 amendments by Illinois Legislature to add categories for
exercise of long-arm jurisdiction by Illinois Courts, including making or performing “any
contract or state” or promise substantially connected with the performing officer or
director duties of any corporation either incorporated in or headquartered in Illinois).
64
Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966).
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Court “endorsed the categories of specific and general jurisdiction as two
distinct types of in personam jurisdiction” in 1984.65 Consequently, in
Georgia, the “arising from” requirement was not seen as limiting the
long-arm because personal jurisdiction in the context of distinct specific
and general jurisdiction had not been integrated into the courts’ analyses.
Shellenberger v. Tanner provides a prime example of the effects of
indeterminacy in establishing constitutional due process limits on judicial
interpretation of categorical long-arm statutes such as Georgia’s.66 In that
case, the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed International Shoe and
subsequent cases to create a three-part test for determining constitutional
due process limits. A misinterpretation is evident in the second prong of
its test:
From International Shoe’s “skeleton” and the subsequent
“fleshing out” cases can be gleaned three “rules” by which to
judge the power of a forum state to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant. They are: . . . (2) The plaintiff must have
a legal cause of action against the nonresident, which arises out
of, or results from, the activity or activities of the defendant
within the forum . . . .67

This statement highlights the mistaken notion by many courts at that time
that the cause of action must always arise directly out of the nonresident
defendant’s activities to meet constitutional due process. Of course,
International Shoe did not require that. Chief Justice Stone explicitly
recognized that a nonresident defendant could have such extensive,
regular, and systematic contacts with the forum so as to be a virtual
citizen of the forum by virtue of the nonresident defendant’s dominating
presence.68 That point was driven home by the United States Supreme
Court’s decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,69 which
upheld personal jurisdiction where the claim did not relate to the
nonresident defendant’s activities in the forum. The Shellenberger Court,
however, helped perpetuate the notion that the long-arm statute was to be
construed to due process limits as that court understood those limits
when it stated that the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Coe &

65
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It’s Not General
Jurisdiction, or Specific Jurisdiction, but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
559, 565 (1998) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
nn.8-9 (1984) as the case where the United States Supreme Court first recognized the
concept).
66
227 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
67
Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
68
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
69
342 U.S. 437 (1952).
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Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.70 had “indicated that jurisdiction over
nonresidents who commit a ‘tortious act’ in Georgia shall be extended to
the maximum limits permitted by due process.”71
Other notable cases involving problematic, or inconsistent, judicial
interpretation of the long-arm statue based on shifting views of the
Constitutional limits have primarily involved subsections (1), (2) and (3)
of the long-arm statute.72 Judicial treatment of subsection (1) will be
discussed first, followed by a discussion of subsections (2) and (3)
together due to the interrelatedness in their application.
a. Subsection (1): “Transacts any Business” Category.
Until the recent change by the Supreme Court of Georgia,73
subsection (1) had been consistently interpreted as applying to contract
actions only. Consequently, the inconsistency in application by the
Georgia state courts regarding subsection (1) primarily involves the
required contacts with the state. This part will first detail the application
issues with an analysis of two Supreme Court of Georgia and two
Georgia Court of Appeals cases. It will then discuss how the federal
court decisions are inconsistent with the state court decisions as well as
with the statutory language. Finally, the recent decision by the Georgia
Supreme Court,74 which overruled all the cases that had limited the
application of subsection (1) to contract causes of action and physical
contacts only, will be discussed.
What constitutes “transacts any business” (and hence what falls
within the category) was construed liberally in Davis Metals, Inc. v.
Allen,75 but the contacts required with the state were then construed
narrowly in O. N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp.76 In Davis Metals,
Davis Metals sued Allen, a former employee, for breaching a
noncompete covenant after Allen moved to Alabama and started a
competing business. The trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and
70

195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973), overruled on other grounds by Anderson v. Deas, 632
S.E.2d 682 (Ga. 2006).
71
Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 273. The perpetuation can be seen in the numerous
subsequent federal court decisions citing this case, as well as Coe & Payne Co., for the
notion that Georgia’s long-arm statute has been construed to extend to the limits of due
process. Also, it indirectly did so with the numerous federal courts citing other federal
court decisions which had relied on Shellenberger.
72
See supra Section II.B.
73
See supra Section II.B.1; see also supra, note 22.
74
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620
S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005).
75
198 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. 1973).
76
206 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. 1974). But see Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs,
L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005).
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the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the “‘liability here, if any, did
not arise from any business transaction in Georgia, but instead from the
defendant’s competing outside Georgia in the State of Alabama.’”77 In
reversing the dismissal, the Supreme Court of Georgia emphasized that
the focus on where the business competition occurred was misplaced.
The focus, instead, should be on the contract, which was entered into in
Georgia, and not the place where ultimately it may have been breached:
The act that gives birth to a cause of action because of the
competition carried on in Alabama is the contract entered into by
the parties in the State of Georgia. The Georgia contract gives the
appellant a cause of action if a breach occurs, and it is immaterial
if the breach occurs within or without the State of Georgia.78

The Court went on to state that “the trend of the opinions is to construe
long arm ‘transacting any business’ statutes most liberally and to uphold
the jurisdiction of the court of the plaintiff’s residence in actions, arising
either directly or indirectly, out of such transactions.”79 Thus, the
category appeared to be as broad as the limits of due process.
Despite the expansive application given the “transacting any
business” language in Davis Metals, the Supreme Court of Georgia did
place limits that, in effect, narrowed the scope to something less than the
limits of due process in O. N. Jonas Co. by restricting the application of
subsection (1) so as to require more forum contacts than those that would
suffice to meet the minimum contacts standard.80 That case involved a
contract dispute with a nonresident defendant who had purchased goods
from a Georgia corporation. In holding there was no personal
jurisdiction, the Court distinguished Davis Metals, stating “in that case a
contract between the parties had been executed and partially performed
within the State of Georgia, the contract itself provided that it was to be
interpreted and construed pursuant to the laws of Georgia, and the cause
of action against the nonresident arose solely by breach of this Georgia
contract.”81 In contrast, in O.N. Jonas Co., “there were no negotiations
or contracts entered into in Georgia with respect to the goods that are the
subject matter of these actions. Purchase orders for the goods originated

77

Davis Metals, 198 S.E.2d at 287.
Id.
Id at 287-88.
80
For example, a district court sitting in Georgia would later hold that “the Georgia
long-arm statute . . . is narrower than constitutional due process and thus requires more
contacts with the forum than constitutional due process.” Evans v. Am. Surplus
Underwriters Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
81
O.N. Jonas Co., 206 S.E.2d at 439.
78
79
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outside of the state.”82 The Court suggested that these are not contacts at
all, reasoning:
The goods were shipped FOB shipping point, such shipping point
being in Georgia, and . . . that is the only contact that appellees
had with this state with respect to the goods purchased by them.
We hold that this is an insufficient “contact” with the State of
Georgia to comply with the requirement of transacting “any
business within this state” . . . .83

Although agents of the defendant had visited the plaintiff’s plant in
Georgia, because they had not initiated the purchase order while there,
this was not deemed to be a contact: “The evidence showed that none of
the goods involved in these actions was purchased by the appellees
during their agents’ visit to appellant’s Georgia plant.”84 Thus, whereas
in Davis Metals personal jurisdiction was found because the employee
had entered into the contract in Georgia, if the contract is not
consummated in Georgia, even if the nonresident defendant submitted
the purchase order and agents visited the state in connection with the
purchase, then personal jurisdiction does not arise under subsection (1).
Based on this ruling, since the purchase orders were made by telephone
or mail, Georgia courts had, until recently, held that telephonic, mail,
and, later, e-mail communications from a nonresident defendant were not
sufficient to create personal jurisdiction under subsection (1).85 Those
82

Id.
Id.
84
Id at 438.
85
See, e.g, Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608
S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); First Nat’l Bank Of Ames v. Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated
in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); First Nat’l Bank Of Ames v. Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d in part and vacated
in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Burt v. Energy Servs. Inv. Corp., 427 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App.
1993); Commercial Food Specialties, Inc. v. Quality Food Equip. Co., 338 S.E.2d 865
(Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Graphic Mach., Inc. v. H. M. S. Direct Mail Serv., Inc., 281 S.E.2d
343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981). Of course, the United States Supreme Court has not restricted
the exercise of personal jurisdiction to only physical contacts with the defendant,
specifically holding that mail and telephone contacts are sufficient:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because
the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial
presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant’s affiliation with a
State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an
inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of
business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which
business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor’s efforts are
“purposefully directed” toward residents of another State, we have
83
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cases where personal jurisdiction was upheld involved circumstances
where the contract was consummated in Georgia, or the nonresident was
purposely directing activity toward Georgia for economic benefit while
either physically within the state or sending physical items into the
state.86
However, the Georgia Court of Appeals later expanded the scope of
the long-arm by allowing for a new type of contact (at least with respect
to bank plaintiffs) in Georgia Railroad Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton.87
The court did so by shifting the focus from whether the contract was
consummated in Georgia to whether the nonresident purposefully availed
his or herself of the protections of Georgia law by doing some act in the
state and whether there was a “substantial effect” in the forum from the
contact. The “substantial effect” criterion was adopted from the threepart test the Court of Appeals had extrapolated from International Shoe
[in Shellenberger v. Tanner,88 which involved a tort claim]. In Barton,
the nonresident defendant had obtained a $125,000 loan from the
plaintiff bank and then defaulted.89 Relying on, inter alia, the holding in
O.N. Jonas Co., Inc., supra, Barton argued that because he signed the
promissory notes in South Carolina, and had only visited the forum a few
times to negotiate the loan and its repayment, he did not have the
required contacts with the forum.90 The Court, however, citing
Shellenberger, stated that “‘[a] single event may be a sufficient basis if
its effects within the forum are substantial enough . . . .’”91 Because
Barton “knowingly and purposefully availed himself of the financial
resources of a Georgia banking institution” and “the economic effect of a
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can
defeat personal jurisdiction there.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
86
See, e.g., Genesis Research Inst., Inc. v. Roxbury Press, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 637 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000) (negotiation within state of terms of contract upon which cause of action
based is a sufficient contact); SES Indus., Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 512
S.E.2d 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (nonresident buyer from manufacturer initiated contact
with plaintiff, and traveled to Georgia plant to inspect the item and finalize and sign the
contract); Bosworth v. Cooney, 274 S.E.2d 604 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (nonresident
defendant negotiated and executed escrow contract in Georgia); Hollingsworth v. Cunard
Line, Ltd.., 263 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (one factor in upholding personal
jurisdiction over cruise line was its distribution of ticket stock to travel agencies in
Georgia); Brooks Shoe Mfg., Inc. v. Byrd, 241 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)
(nonresident shoe manufacturer participated in Georgia trade show for three consecutive
years with intent to reap economic benefit).
87
315 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
88
227 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text.
89
Ga. R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 315 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
90
Id. at 19.
91
Id.
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default of $125,000 would be ‘substantial’”, this established “legally
sufficient contacts.”92 The Court summarily distinguished O.N. Jonas,
stating that the “contacts in the instant case differ both qualitatively and
quantitatively from those in Jonas . . . .”93 It is hard to see much of a
difference, because one could say the nonresident buyer in O.N. Jonas
had purposefully availed itself of the manufacturing resources of a
Georgia manufacturer and that the lack of payments to O.N. Jonas had a
substantial economic effect (assuming the amount owed to the plaintiff
was substantial).
A more fundamental problem, however, is with the use of the test
articulated in Shellenberger. In that case, the Court of Appeals gave two
different three-part tests: the first was a test for meeting the International
Shoe constitutional due process requirements;94 the second was a test for
meeting the tortious act requirement of the long-arm statute’s subsection
(2).95 In Barton, the court relied on the first test, selectively picking out
the portion of the first prong relating to “substantial” effects, while
ignoring another part of that prong—i.e., that it “is not necessary that the
defendant or his agent be physically within the forum, for an act or
transaction by mail may suffice”96—which directly contradicted prior
holdings of the Georgia Supreme Court that mail contacts are
insufficient. Thus, Barton’s expansion of the contacts scope of
subsection (1) was based on selecting a portion of the Shellenberger test
that was meant to define constitutional due process limits and
incorporating it into the judicial construction of the long-arm statute.
This holding was followed in Robertson v. CRI, Inc.,97 where a
nonresident personal guarantor of a $400,000 loan for a corporation of
which he was an officer was found to have sufficient contacts for
personal jurisdiction, although he had signed the guarantee in California:
“[A]s in Barton, Robertson could be characterized as having availed
himself of the resources of a Georgia financial institution, and the loan
could be characterized as substantial, thus showing the purposeful
activity in Georgia required to satisfy the first prong of the test.”98
Therefore, at least where a bank loan is involved, the contact requirement
of subsection (1) is broader under the Georgia Court of Appeals’
holdings than it has been construed in other contexts—without any
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 20.
Id.
Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 272.
Id. at 273.
Shellenberger, 227 S.E.2d at 272.
601 S.E.2d 163 (Ga. App. 2004).
Id. at 166.
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principled justification offered to explain the difference. This is
inconsistent with the Georgia Supreme Court’s holdings that required
consummation of the contract in the state.
Of course, application of any long-arm statute goes on in two
parallel court systems. State-law claims heard in federal court under the
diversity-of-citizenship category of federal subject matter jurisdiction
can partake of the forum state’s long-arm statute as a means of affecting
extraterritorial service of process on nonresident defendants, 99 since
Congress has not enabled a general federal long-arm statute. While
courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts have generally
proven to be far less demure about expansive positions on their personal
jurisdiction. Thus, the federal courts, sitting in their diversity-ofcitizenship jurisdiction, with a few exceptions,100 have expanded the
scope of subsection (1) to the limits of due process. Most federal courts
skip the long-arm analysis altogether, relying on somewhat loose dicta
from the state courts in Georgia to the effect that the long-arm extends to
the limits of due process, and thereby only addressing due process
concerns.101 Other federal courts purport to be applying the categorical
approach of the long-arm statute, but construe it in a way that extends it
to the limits of due process. Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews102 is a
typical example. There, the federal court constructed a detailed defense
of how the long-arm statute provided for general jurisdiction. In doing so
99

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) & (h)(1) (providing that service upon individuals,
corporations and associations may be made “pursuant to the law of the state in which the
district court is located. . . . ”).
100
The exceptions include: Swafford v. Avakian, 581 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir. 1978)
(nonresident’s only contacts with Georgia were telephone calls and letters; citing
Shellenberger’s statement that activity under subsection (1) needs to be more extensive
than activity under subsection (2)); Fulghum Indus., Inc. v. Walterboro Forest Prod., Inc.,
477 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1973) (although nonresident defendant conducted business in
Georgia, the breach of contract was unrelated to that business); Evans v. Am. Surplus
Underwriters Corp., 739 F. Supp. 1526, 1533 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding the long-arm to be
“narrower than constitutional due process and thus requir[ing] more contacts with the
forum than constitutional due process.”); Fowler Prods. Co. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of
Tulsa, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 1339 (M.D. Ga. 1976).
101
See, e.g., Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm, 19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994) (skipping
the long-arm application and stating that general jurisdiction is available in Georgia);
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Peridyne
Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (N.D. Ga.
2000) (straight due process analysis, after citing several cases holding that long-arm
extends to due process limits); Allegiant Physicians Servs., Inc. v. Sturdy, 926 F. Supp.
1106 (N.D. Ga 1996) (while acknowledging Georgia Supreme Court’s restrictive holding
in Gust, cites Francosteel for the proposition that, at least for contract claims, the longarm reaches to the limits of due process); Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 201
(N.D. Ga. 1969) (the first to state the long-arm extends to due process limits).
102
291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002).
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the Eleventh Circuit selectively quoted from the long-arm statute,
conspicuously omitting the “as to a cause of action arising from”103
language:
The Georgia long-arm statute provides for the exercise of
“personal jurisdiction over any nonresident . . . if in person or
through an agent, he: (1) Transacts any business within this state;
. . . or (4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated
within this state.”.104

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the long-arm statute allows for
general personal jurisdiction basically recasts the statute to mean
something that appears quite different from what it says.
It may be helpful, before addressing the Georgia Supreme Court’s
latest rulings, to summarize the varying interpretative canons: While the
“transacts any business” category is to be construed liberally, the
Georgia Supreme Court narrowed it by requiring the contract to have
been consummated in Georgia and by holding that telephone and mail
communications from the nonresident, as well as isolated visits in
relation to the contract, did not aggregate to the threshold of minimum
contacts. The Court of Appeals have expanded the scope, at least for
bank plaintiffs, by shifting the focus from the place of contract
consummation to whether the nonresident had purposefully availed itself
of the protections of Georgia law and if the contact had a substantial
effect in the forum. The federal courts, despite the boundaries given in
cases following Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins,105 have expanded the
reach of these subsections to the limits of due process, including even
general jurisdiction, through an interpretative process that selectively
ignores portions of the statute.
In Innovative Clinical and Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First
National Bank of Ames,106 the Georgia Supreme Court, though, has
seemingly laid to rest these differing interpretations as to this aspect of
Georgia’s long-arm statute. The case involved claims of breach of
contract, fraud, and conversion by Innovative Clinical and Consulting
Services, L.L.C. (ICCS), a Georgia resident, against First Nat. Bank of
Ames (the bank), located in Iowa. The bank had taken a security interest
in a lease agreement that ICCS had made as lessee with a financing

103

GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (West 2004).
Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738, 746 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91).
105
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
106
620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005).
104
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corporation, which was a customer of the bank.107 Relying on the prior
judicial holdings that subsection (1) only applied to contract actions, the
Georgia Court of Appeals applied subsection (1) to the breach of contract
claim only, finding that, even if the taking of a security interest in the
lease constituted transacting business in Georgia, ICCS’s breach of
contract claim was not “remotely related to the security interest taken by
the bank.”108 From this Court of Appeals ruling, the Georgia Supreme
Court granted certiorari “to address perceived inconsistencies in our
precedents defining the scope of personal jurisdiction that Georgia courts
may exercise over nonresidents pursuant to . . . the Georgia long-arm
statute.”109 After affirming an earlier holding that subsections (2) and (3)
are to be interpreted literally,110 the court stated that, to be consistent,
subsection (1) should also be interpreted literally.111 Consequently,
because “[n]othing in subsection (1) limits its application to contract
cases” or “requires the physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or
minimizes the import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with the
State,”112 the court held these limitations no longer apply and, therefore,
subsection (1) reaches “to the maximum extent permitted by procedural
due process.”113 As a result, the court “overrule[d] all prior cases that
fail[ed] to accord the appropriate breadth to the construction of the
‘transacting any business’ language”114 of subsection (1). The court then
vacated and remanded the case to the Georgia Court of Appeals to
consider whether personal jurisdiction may be obtained under subsection
(1) based on the new interpretation.115 On remand, the Court of Appeals
upheld the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant bank,
stating that the bank’s “postal, telephone, and other intangible Georgia
contacts” were sufficient under the new broader interpretation of
subsection (1).116

107

First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 598
S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
108
Id. at 534.
109
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 353.
110
Id. at 354. The twists and turns of the interpretations of subsections (2) and (3),
culminating in the decision to apply them separately and literally in Gust v. Flint, 356
S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987), are discussed, infra, in Section II.B.3.b.
111
Id at 355.
112
Id.
113
Id. (quoting Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ga.
1973)).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 356.
116
First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C., 634
S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). The court also held that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction was within the limits of constitutional due process, because “the bank’s
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This expansion of subsection (1) makes subsection (3) superfluous.
Now when a nonresident tortfeasor commits a tortious act resulting in
injury within the state, personal jurisdiction is available under subsection
(1). Subsection (3), with its stricter business contact requirements, would
appear unnecessary. The Innovative Clinical holding appears also to
ignore the problem of the defamation exception in subsection (2). That
exception was included when the long-arm statute was originally
enacted. It seems unlikely that the Legislature would have made this
exception in subsection (2), without also limiting subsection (1), if
subsection (1) is truly as broad in scope as declared in Innovative
Clinical. Far more plausible is the notion that the Legislature did not
contemplate that subsection (1) would be applicable to tort actions. In the
wake of Innovative Clinical, the defamation exception of subsection (2)
appears now only applicable where one defames another while not
transacting business in the state. Similarly, subsection (4) now appears of
limited relevance, because most causes of action relating to the
ownership or use of real property usually arise out of the transaction of
business.
In any event, the interpretative inconsistencies of the previously
discussed state court cases have now been surmounted by a new
interpretation, the incredibly broad scope of extraterritorial personal
jurisdiction which, as discussed above, has been attributed by the federal
courts to Georgia’s long-arm statute. However, it remains to be seen
whether the Eleventh Circuit will retract its interpretation that the statute
extends to general jurisdiction. This does not seem likely, because the
Georgia Supreme Court stated that subsection (1) now reaches to the
limits of due process117 (even though in actuality it does not – it is still
limited by the “arising from” language to specific personal jurisdiction).
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit will likely adhere to its sweeping gloss on the
statute and allow general personal jurisdiction due to the Georgia
Supreme Court’s dictum in Innovative Clinical, just as it did in Nippon
Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews.118
With the opening of subsection (1) to tort actions, another issue will
be the scope of the “transacts any business” language in relation to
products that enter Georgia through the stream of commerce and cause
injury. This is a particularly relevant inquiry given the split in the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
‘business’ was not brought to Georgia through a ‘unilateral action’ of ICCS.” Id. (citing
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U. S. 462, 474-475 (1985)).
117
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620
S.E.2d 352, 355.
118
291 F.3d 738 (11th Cir. 2002).
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Court of California119 on what constitutes purposeful availment in those
circumstances. In Asahi, Justice O’Connor, with three justices joining
her, wrote that the purposeful availment necessary for minimum contacts
requires more than just an awareness by the defendant “that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State. . .”120—it
requires “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant [that] may indicate an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State . . . .”121 Justice
Brennan, with three justices joining him, disagreed with the “additional
conduct” requirement, writing that a defendant’s placing of a product in
the stream of commerce with an awareness “that the final product is
being marketed in the forum State”122 is all that is necessary to meet the
purposeful availment test for minimum contacts. Hence, at some point,
the Georgia courts will need to decide whether to require the “additional
conduct” or not.123 The principles of corrective justice and enterprise
regulation discussed in Section III, infra, and incorporated into our
model long-arm statute in Section IV, infra, will help to guide the courts
in this decision.
b. Subsections (2) and (3): The “Tortious Act” and “Tortious
Injury” Categories
Subsections (2) and (3)124—the “tortious act” and “tortious injury”
categories—will be discussed next. The inconsistency in application
initially involved whether subsection (2) should be interpreted as the
“Illinois Rule” or the “New York Rule.” Later application
inconsistencies involved the contact requirements of subsections (2) and
(3).
As previously discussed,125 in O’Neal Steel the Georgia Court of
Appeals rejected the “Illinois Rule,” holding that under subsection (2)
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant attaches only when
the tortious act (or conduct) as well as the injury occurs in the state.
Consequently, the legislature adopted subsection (3).126 Despite the
apparent distinction between subsections (2) and (3), as reflected by the
Georgia legislature’s amendment, the Supreme Court of Georgia
119

480 U.S. 102 (1987).
Id. at 112.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123
See, e.g., Parry v. Ernst Home Ctr. Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 666-67 (Utah 1989)
(holding that “[w]ithout a showing of ‘additional conduct,’ we are unable to find that the
eventual sale of a product in Utah justifies personal jurisdiction.”).
124
GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2004).
125
See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
126
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
120
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subsequently adopted the “Illinois Rule” interpretation of subsection (2)
in Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp.127 “[T]he negligence
occurring outside the state cannot be separated from the resulting injury
occurring within the state,” the court wrote, adding that “[i]n other
words, a ‘tortious act’ is a composite of both negligence and damage, and
if damage occurred within the state then the tortious act occurred within
the state within the meaning of subsection [(2)] of the Long Arm
Statute.”128 As many courts and commentators observed, this holding
appeared to make subsection (3) superfluous.129 Accordingly, courts
using the expansive Coe & Payne interpretation began finding personal
jurisdiction under subsection (2) where the act occurred outside the state,
making subsection (3) seemingly unnecessary.130
But then, at its first opportunity, the Georgia Supreme Court
established the relevance of subsection (3) in Clarkson Power Flow, Inc.
v. Thompson.131 In that case, the court reaffirmed the adoption of the
“Illinois Rule” in Coe & Payne, but noted “that limitations similar to
those present in subsection [(3)] are constitutionally mandated under
subsection [(2)].”132 This holding appeared to turn the tables and make
subsection (2) superfluous. The Court said as much when it stated that
“[w]e thus conclude that there is no essential difference between
subsections [(2)] and [(3)].”133 Thus, although personal jurisdiction could
be obtained under subsection (2) over a nonresident who commits an act
or omission outside the state resulting in an injury inside the state (á la
the liberal “Illinois Rule”), the application was substantially restricted by
requiring the same high level of contacts that are part-and-parcel of
subsection (3).
127
195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973) (upholding personal jurisdiction over nonresident
manufacturer whose adhesive allegedly caused fire which killed workers and damaged
building in Georgia).
128
Id. at 400-01.
129
For example, the Northern District of Georgia explained:
Admittedly, the effect of this liberal application of subsection [(2)] is to
virtually read subsection [(3)] out of existence and render it superfluous,
since it adds nothing to the extent of in personam jurisdiction available
under subsection [(2)], while seemingly imposing an additional and more
stringent test of business contracts with the forum state.
Thornton v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 476, 480 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1975)
(citing several Georgia journals and publications supporting this view).
130
See, e.g., Greenfield v. Portman, 221 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Delta
Equities, Inc. v. Larwin Mortgage Investors, 211 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Davis v.
Haupt Bros. Gas Co., 206 S.E.2d 598 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Lincoln Land Co. v. Palfery,
203 S.E.2d 597 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973).
131
260 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1979).
132
Id. at 11.
133
Id.
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Two subsequent decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court, however,
reasserted the applicability of subsection (2) by separating it from
subsection (3) and returning to a literal interpretation of both subsections,
which is the controlling interpretation of the two subsections today by
the Georgia state courts. The first decision, Bradlee Management
Services, Inc. v. Cassells,134 involved a defamation action against a
nonresident reporter who prepared a report on nursing home abuse. That
report implicated the plaintiff’s nursing home when shown on the local
news.135 The court of appeals had reversed the trial court’s denial of a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding “that
subsection [(3)] . . . cannot be interpreted to provide jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants in defamation cases because of the exclusion of
defamation cases in subsection [(2)].”136 The court of appeals based its
decision on the holding in Clarkson Power Flow, “‘that there is no
essential difference between subsections [(2)] and [(3)].’”137 The
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, but for different reasons. The court
implied that personal jurisdiction could be obtained in a defamation
action using subsection (3), recognizing two federal district court cases
in Georgia which had held “that under subsection [(3)] of our Long Arm
Statute Georgia courts do have jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
in defamation cases when there exist requisite minimum contacts other
than the commission of the tort itself.”138 In this particular case, though,
the court noted “the specified minimum contacts required by subsection
[(3)] are not present as to defendant Cassells here.”139 Thus, as one court
later observed, “the Bradlee decision in fact departs from Clarkson
Power Flow because it reads subsections (2) and (3) separately.”140
The second decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia, Gust v.
Flint,141 involved a tort claim for fraud against a Wisconsin resident who
had kept the plaintiff’s deposit for the purchase of a truck the defendant
had advertised in a trade publication after the plaintiff refused to accept a
substitute truck. The defendant’s only contacts with the state were the
advertisement and subsequent phone calls with the plaintiff concerning
134

292 S.E.2d 717 (Ga. 1982).
Id. at 718-19.
136
Id. at 720.
137
Id. (quoting Clarkson Power Flow, Inc. v. Thompson, 260 S.E.2d 9 (Ga. 1979)).
138
Id. (citing Process Control Corp. v. Witherup Fabrication & Erection, Inc., 439 F.
Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga 1975) and Southard v. Forbes, Inc., Civ. No. 74-1984A (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 25, 1975).
139
Id.
140
James Whiten Livestock, Inc. v. W. Iowa Farms, Co., 750 F. Supp. 529, 533-34
(N.D. Ga. 1990).
141
356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987).
135
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the sale of the truck. The court of appeals had reversed the trial court’s
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. In doing so, it acknowledged the ruling
in Clarkson Power Flow that subsections (2) and (3) are essentially the
same. However, the court stated that since the Supreme Court of Georgia
had not expressed an intention to renounce the principle adopted in Coe
& Payne—that the long-arm statute be construed to the maximum extent
of due process—it could find personal jurisdiction under subsection
(2).142 The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed with a terse analysis,
simply stating that the case was controlled by a “literal construction of
Georgia’s long-arm statute.”143 The court observed, “[w]e need not
discuss the relative merits of a ‘New York rule’ or an ‘Illinois rule;’”
rather, “[t]he rule that controls is our statute, which requires that an outof-state defendant must do certain acts within the State of Georgia before
he can be subjected to personal jurisdiction. Where, as here, it is shown
that no such acts were committed, there is no jurisdiction.”144
After these two cases, it was apparent that Georgia courts would
interpret subsections (3) and (2) separately and literally, and that is what
the appellate courts did.145 Yet, Georgia courts recognized the disparity
142

1987).
143

Flint v. Gust, 351 S.E.2d 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986), rev’d, 356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga.

Gust, 356 S.E.2d at 514.
Id. One justice observed, however, that “[f]or my part, I fail to see why Georgia
would not want its courts to have the maximum jurisdiction permissible within
constitutional due process.” Id. at 130 (Gregory, J., concurring). Thus, there was
recognition from the court that this decision made it such that the long-arm statute was
now not being interpreted to the limits of due process, despite the previous statement in
Coe & Payne.
145
For cases supporting this separate and literal interpretation, see Catholic
Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(analyzing theft of propriety information claim under subsection (3) because the alleged
act occurred outside the state and finding personal jurisdiction lacking since the
defendant did not regularly conduct business in the state), cert. denied, 2005 Ga. LEXIS
401 (May 23, 2005); First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting
Servs., L.L.C., 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (following Gust with reservations in
dismissing fraud claim analyzed under subsection (3), because alleged tortious act
occurred outside state by defendant that did not regularly do business in the state), aff’d
in part and vacated in part, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005); Worthy v. Eller, 594 S.E.2d 699
(Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (asserting personal jurisdiction over intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim against Alabama attorney analyzed under subsection (3),
because alleged act originated in Alabama; claim dismissed due to lack of the contacts
required by that subsection) cert. denied, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 514 (June 7, 2004); ETS
Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (analyzing the
determination of personal jurisdiction under subsection (3) because defendant committed
alleged tortious act outside the state; dismissed due to lack of the contacts required by
that subsection; performing no analysis under subsection (2)); Metzler v. Love, 428
S.E.2d 384 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (personal jurisdiction denied because the defendant did
not commit the tortious act within the state as required by subsection (2) and did not have
the contacts required under subsection (3)); Showa Denko K.K. v. Pangle, 414 S.E.2d
144
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between the Supreme Court of Georgia precedents which had stated that
the long-arm statute extends to the limits of due process and the holding
in Gust. For example, on remand in Gust, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that in Coe & Payne,
the Supreme Court had expressed the view that our long-arm
statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants “to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due
process.” In its decision in the present case, the Supreme Court
would appear to have abandoned that view and to have adopted
the position that our long-arm statute is not susceptible to such an
interpretation. However, since Coe & Payne was not overruled,
clarification of the Supreme Court’s position on this important
issue will have to await a future litigation.146

That clarification finally arrived eighteen years later when the
Supreme Court of Georgia held that in Gust it had “rejected” Coe &
Payne Co., as well as other cases, and had “reinstated the difference
between subsections (2) and (3) established by the literal language of the
statute.”147 More significant than the clarification, however, was the
expansion of subsection (1) to tort actions, as discussed, supra, in
Section II.B.3.b, which has made subsection (2) of limited application
and subsection (3) superfluous.148 Subsection (2) appears to have a
distinct function only where a nonresident commits a tort in the state that
does not arise out of the transaction of business. Likewise, subsection
(3), due to its business contact requirements, appears now completely
subsumed within the broader “transacts any business” contact
requirement of subsection (1). Thus, while reiterating the separateness of
658 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding personal jurisdiction under subsection (3) due to
defendant’s agent’s contacts with the state) (reaffirming separate and literal interpretation
of subsections (2) and (3), but also announcing a literal interpretation of subsection (1)
which expands that subsection to the limits of due process by allowing personal
jurisdiction over any nonresident who transacts any business in Georgia).
146
Flint v. Gust, 361 S.E.2d 722, 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
147
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames,
620 S.E.2d 352, 354 (Ga. 2005). In Innovative Clinical, the court made a point to note
that the legislature had chosen not to expand the statute to the limits of due process since
the holding in Gust. This might strike the reader as somewhat ironic, given the history of
amendments that the legislature enacted to expand the statute as limitations were
encountered through early federal and state court decisions, as discussed in Section
II.B.2, supra, and given the dicta by the court itself in many cases stating the state’s
policy was to reach the limits of due process. Even after Gust, which purported to
abandon the “Illinois Rule,” the court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga.
1992), reiterated in a footnote the same limits of due process policy. Thus, it is quite
possible that the court’s own history of dicta that the long-arm statute reached due
process limits influenced legislative somnolence on delivering a legislative coup de gras.
148
Supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
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subsections (2) and (3), the Court, in Innovative Clinical, supra, made
the point moot when it expanded subsection (1) such that subsection (3)
has no necessary application.
This somewhat confusing litany of judicial interpretation of
Georgia’s long-arm statute has been made more complicated by the
federal courts, which held shortly after the enactment of the long-arm
statute that it was coterminous with due process limits and adopted the
“Illinois Rule” for subsection (2).149 And, despite the holding in Gust,
the federal courts in Georgia, particularly after the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Francosteel Corp. v. M/V Charm,150 have continued to
interpret the long-arm statute to the limits of due process, and thus ignore
the contacts requirement of subsection (3),151 with a few exceptions.152
149

The district court in Georgia (which was the first court to interpret the long-arm’s
“tortious act” language) adopted the “Illinois Rule,” holding that the place of the injury is
where the tortious act occurs. Scott v. Crescent Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga.
1968) (upholding personal jurisdiction in negligence action against nonresident
manufacturer of punch machine that injured resident plaintiff). Coming to this
conclusion, the court looked to Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961), which interpreted an Illinois statute similarly to the Georgia
statute at issue. The court stated that “[s]ince the Georgia legislature might have had the
Gray case . . . in mind when it wrote a very similar statute for Georgia, there is good
reason to think that the highest court in the state would similarly interpret the Georgia
statute.” Scott, 176 N.E.2d at 156-57. The court offered several justifications for adopting
the broader interpretation, including the following (which are just as relevant today):
[I]f the court decided that the negligence here could not be considered
within § [9-10-91(2)], a gaping hole in Georgia’s long-arm statute would be
left. Cases of negligent manufacture outside the state are numerous and will
continue to grow in number with the increased tempo of interstate business
being done by corporate enterprise. The purpose of the statute is to protect
Georgia residents from the torts of foreign corporations suffered within this
state. The beneficiaries of this act would be ill-protected if they were forced
to go to distant places to sue for injuries committed within this state by
negligently manufactured goods from outside. Georgia should not be a safe
haven for the negligence of foreign corporations sending goods into the
state. This court will not impute to the Georgia legislature, nor to the
Georgia courts, a desire to leave Georgia citizens unprotected in such an
important, and growing, area of litigation.
Id. at 157.
150
19 F.3d 624 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating in dictum that general jurisdiction is available
under Georgia’s long-arm statute).
151
Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840 F.2d 843, 848-49 (11th
Cir. 1988) (stating that subsections (2) and (3) have been “interpreted to the maximum
limits of due process . . .” without mentioning Gust, decided eight months earlier, and
instead applying the Shellenberger test, which it states applies to both subsections (2) and
(3)); Barton S. Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(analyzing internet tort action under due process analysis because long-arm extends to
limits of due process, but also finding lack of personal jurisdiction under due process);
Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing Francosteel, and
also stating that the Georgia Supreme Court after Gust reaffirmed due process limits
policy of long-arm in Allstate v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992), in holding that courts
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Initially, some federal district courts followed the newly restrictive
approach of the Georgia Supreme Court.153 However, after Francosteel,
where the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its view that the long-arm statute
went to the limits of due process, most federal courts, while
acknowledging Gust and the uncertainty of the extensiveness of the longarm statute in some cases, construed the long-arm to the limits of due
process and went straight to a due process analysis154—despite the fact
that Francosteel was a breach of contract action that cited only breach of
contract cases from the Georgia courts in evaluating the due process
limits of the long-arm statute. Because Francosteel did not limit its
assertion, as prior cases had, to contract actions and subsection (1) of the
long-arm statute, federal courts appear ro have overlooked this important
qualification and simply applied Francosteel’s gloss to tort actions,
“may pass over analysis of the statute and exercise jurisdiction where the constitutional
requirements are satisfied.”); Peridyne Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d. 1366, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (“Although there has been some
disagreement as to whether the Georgia long-arm statute extends to the maximum extent
of due process for all claims, numerous district courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held in
recent decisions that the Georgia long-arm statute confers personal Jurisdiction to the full
extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution” and thus
can go straight to due process analysis regarding all claims); Allegiant Physicians Servs.,
Inc. v. Sturdy Mem’l Hosp., 926 F. Supp. 1106, 1112-1113 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (recognizing
controversy over whether long-arm extends to due process limits; although Eleventh
Circuit in Francosteel continued to construe long-arm to due process limits, it was a
contract action and did not specify whether it also applied to tort actions; however, in this
case due process limits not met so no need to decide whether long-arm statute extends to
due process limits for tort actions); Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (although refers to subsection (3), no mention of Gust and states the long-arm is
coextensive with due process, citing Francosteel and thus extending to tort actions
Francosteel’s statement regarding the long-arm’s coextensiveness with due process
limits); Howell v. Komori Am. Corp., 816 F. Supp. 1547, 1552 n.9 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
(“Subsections two and three have the same analytical framework to determine whether
jurisdiction is proper.” Thus the court simply determines whether either the act or injury
occurred in Georgia and then applies due process analysis).
152
Weinstock v. Gannett, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-2935-ODE, 2001 WL 1147214 (N.D.
Ga. June 20, 2001) (recognizing a distinction between subsections (2) and (3)—finding
personal jurisdiction lacking in libel action due to defamation exception of subsection (2),
and because defendant did not have contacts required by subsection (3)); James Whiten
Livestock, Inc. v. W. Iowa Farms, Co., 750 F. Supp. 529, 532-534 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(Gust, together with Bradlee, established that subsections (2) and (3) are separate and to
be construed literally; reasoning that Gust impliedly overruled Clarkson Power Flow’s
holding that the same contacts of subsection (3) are mandated for subsection (2)); Cable
News Network, Inc. v. Video Monitoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 765, 769-70
(N.D. Ga. 1989) (interpreting “the Gust opinion as renouncing the broad reading of
subsection (2) in favor of a literal reading . . .” thus, holding that only subsection (3)
applies in this case because defendant’s alleged act of copyright infringement occurred
outside state).
153
See supra note 152.
154
See supra note 151.
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ruling that the long-arm was coextensive with due process despite
Gust.155 And, when the Georgia Supreme Court in a footnote in Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Klein,156 restated that the policy of the long-arm statute
is to obtain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the limits
of due process, federal courts zeroed in on that statement to limit the
Gust ruling, initially for contract actions, but then also for tort actions.157
In taking the Allstate court’s statement out of context, these federal
courts have overlooked the fuller context of the ruling in Allstate, in
which the Georgia Supreme Court held that the long-arm statute did not
apply because Allstate was a resident foreign corporation and, thus,
amenable to suit as any other resident of the state, making the footnote
dicta.158 Relying on this dicta and the Francosteel case, which involved
a contract claim, federal courts expanded the policy of due process limits
to all the subsections (categories) of the Georgia long-arm statute. This
expansion process by the Eleventh Circuit culminated in Nippon Credit
Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, which was the first case where the exercise of
personal jurisdiction under Georgia’s long-arm statute was actually
upheld under a general jurisdiction theory.159
c. The Defamation Exclusion of Subsection (2)
The defamation exclusion further highlights the trouble resulting
from categorical long-arm statutes codifying and thus freezing in place
what is thought to be the limits of due process at the time, and the
resulting inconsistent application. It is out of date, based on a Fifth
Circuit line of cases in the 1960s decided prior to the enactment of the
long-arm, which held that First Amendment concerns required greater
showing of contacts to satisfy due process in defamation cases against
nonresidents.160 The rationale was that, because First Amendment
concerns required a heightened burden of proof,161 then these same
155

See, e.g., Urspruch v. Greenblum, 968 F. Supp. 707 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
422 S.E.2d 863, 865 n.1 (Ga. 1992).
157
See, e.g., Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
158
Allstate, 422 S.E.2d at 865.
159
See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
160
“It would appear that subsection [(2)]’s exclusion of causes of action for
defamation of character is based on a line of decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.” Bradlee Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Cassells, 292 S.E.2d 717, 720 (Ga. 1982).
One of the Fifth Circuit cases was New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567, 572
(5th Cir. 1966) (ruling that there were not sufficient contacts for an Alabama federal
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the New York Times, because “First
Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of
contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over
other types of tortious activity”).
161
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
156
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concerns required a greater level of contacts under due process.
However, this rationale was rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in Calder v. Jones162 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.163 The Calder
Court rejected “the suggestion that First Amendment concerns enter into
jurisdictional analysis,” explaining that “[t]he infusion of such concerns
would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry,”164 and thus
the Keeton Court “categorically [rejected] the suggestion that invisible
radiations from the First Amendment may defeat jurisdiction otherwise
proper under the Due Process Clause.”165 Thus, the conclusion appears
inescapable that the defamation exclusion is an anachronism imposing a
now-unnecessary limitation on Georgia’s long-arm statute.
Eventually, the federal district court in the Northern District of
Georgia completely disregarded the defamation exclusion, reasoning
that, after Calder, the Georgia courts would uphold personal jurisdiction
in defamation suits.166 The court held that “[t]he ‘effects’ test affirmed in
Calder is alive and well and Defendants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims in this case based upon personal jurisdiction are squarely
controlled thereby.”167 One might legitimately ask if the federal court, in
light of Erie, might have respected federalism as well as separation of
powers by restraining itself to commending a re-examination of the
defamation exception to the attention of the legislature, rather than
effectively “amending” the statute by a judicial gloss that ignores the
defamation exclusion.168
Despite the “Erie-guess” by the federal district court that Georgia
courts would disregard the defamation exclusion which makes
unfounded assumptions that the Georgia appellate courts do not defer to
the legislature, the Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently dismissed a
defamation suit for lack of personal jurisdiction due to the defamation

162

465 U.S. 783 (1984).
465 U.S. 770 (1984).
164
Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
165
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780, n.12.
166
Horsley v. Feldt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding personal
jurisdiction where anti-abortion activist sues for defamation due to statements defendants
made on national television after plaintiff put crossed-out picture of murdered abortion
doctor on his website), aff’d on other grounds, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002).
167
Id. at 1379.
168
Further adding to the inconsistency, the following year, another district court judge
held that a nonresident defendant was not amenable to personal jurisdiction under
subsection (2) due to the defamation exception. See Weinstock v. Gannett, Inc., No. 1:00CV-2935-ODE, 2001 WL 1147214 (N.D. Ga. June 20, 2001) (recognizing, however, that
personal jurisdiction could be obtained in a defamation suit under subsection (3), but
holding that defendant did not have the contacts required by that subsection).
163
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exclusion in Worthy v. Eller.169 The Court did not refer to Horsley, or
even to Bradlee Management Services, Inc.’s acknowledgement of a
limited exception to the defamation exclusion through subsection (3). In
Worthy, though, the only contact was that the defamatory cause of action
arose out of the defamatory act—there were not sufficient additional
contacts that would allow application of subsection (3) to avoid the
defamation exclusion of subsection (2).170
The contradictory interpretations of the defamation exclusion
further highlight the necessity of a fairer, more predictable long-arm
statute to apply which does not lead to differing interpretations, such that
a plaintiff’s right to relief turns on the court the plaintiff brings suit in.171
4. Limitations of the Statute in Light of Internet Commerce
As the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence of Internet commerce
disputes evolves, courts must have a long-arm statute sufficiently flexible
to adapt to the evolution so that its residents are not unfairly excluded
from redressing grievances in their own state’s courts from injuries
inflicted by nonresidents using this rapidly growing medium. Indeed,
otherwise the ability to resolve the exploding number of cases arising
from e-commerce will be hindered in ways reminiscent of the problems,
before International Shoe, in obtaining personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants engaged in interstate commerce172—without
resorting to ad hoc legal fictions or a plethora of clumsy “exceptions” to
find personal jurisdiction to allow in-state plaintiffs to enjoy a domestic
forum.
There are several differing interpretations of how to analyze
personal jurisdiction in cases involving the Internet which are beyond the
scope of this article.173 The purpose of discussing the effect of the
169
594 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress action by husband against attorney representing wife in divorce
action)..
170
Id. at 700-01.
171
The recent holding by the Georgia Supreme Court in Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Services, L.L.C. v. First National Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005),
expanding subsection (1) to tort actions, will seemingly result in anomalous outcomes in
exercising personal jurisdiction for defamation causes of action – if the defamatory act
arises from the transaction of business, then personal jurisdiction will be available under
subsection (1); but if the act does not arise from the transaction of business, then
subsection (2) applies and its defamation exception will prevent the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. No principled reason has been suggested for such a distinction.
172
See e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923);
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
173
See e.g., Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in
Determining Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 BUS. LAW. 601 (2003); Nicholas R.
Spampata, King Pennoyer Dethroned: A Policy-Analysis-Influenced Study of the Limits of
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Internet on personal jurisdiction in this section is to highlight shortfalls
of categorical long-arm statutes, such as Georgia’s, which restrict
residents’ ability to redress injuries in their home state that arise in the
milieu of the evolving commercial and other Internet activity of
nonresidents.
The recent expansion of subsection (1) by the Georgia Supreme
Court,174 which rejected both the contract-only restriction and the
requirement for physical contacts by the nonresident defendant with the
state, has greatly increased the amenability of a nonresident to personal
jurisdiction in causes of actions arising from the transaction of business
over the Internet. Consequently, because the Court’s decision now allows
for obtaining specific personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process,
there is greater need for principled guidance to ensure this power is
applied predictably and fairly—in other words, due to the expansion of
subsection (1), the focus has changed 180 degrees from a lack of
sufficient protection for residents harmed from the transaction of
business over the Internet (due to the previous contract-only and physical
contact requirement), to a concern now that courts and the bar have at
their disposal a way to analyze and to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction without reaching past the limits of due process. Additionally,
considerations such as whether the business was transacted in the state
(where the website is located on an out-of state server, for example) will
test long-arm statute notions of what constitutes “transacting any
business within the state.”
Despite the expansion of subsection (1), residents are still not fully
protected in their ability to obtain long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants in cases arising in the context of internet activity. There are
circumstances where the technicalities of business transactions are not
involved that will necessarily require the employment of subsection (2),
with all its corresponding limitations, to obtain personal jurisdiction.175
The literal reading of subsection (2) by the Georgia state courts, which
requires the tortious act to be committed within the state, severely limits
the ability of injured residents to obtain personal jurisdiction over
Pennoyer v. Neff in the Personal Jurisdictional Environment of the Internet, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1742 (2000); Allan R. Stein, Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411
(2004); Note, A “Category-Specific” Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal
Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1617 (2004); Note, No Bad Puns:
A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2003).
174
See supra notes 106-117 and accompanying text.
175
Because, as discussed previously, subsection (3) is now effectively superfluous, it
is not necessary to discuss its limitations here.
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nonresidents who commit “cybertorts.” Using the Georgia state courts’
literal reading, it is doubtful whether one located outside the state who
hacks into a computer in the state and deletes or damages files, sends a
virus, otherwise invades privacy, or commits a trespass to chattels
involving a resident’s computer or server, would be amenable to personal
jurisdiction in Georgia, since the tortious act arguably takes place on the
tortfeasor’s computer outside the state. Additionally, the defamation
exclusion is a further limitation: a plaintiff would have no recourse in
Georgia courts under subsection (2) to a nonresident’s posting of
defamatory material on a website that could be accessed in Georgia and
thus cause effects in Georgia. Hence, it is evident even from a cursory
review that the long-arm statute in its current iteration is likely not
sufficient to ensure a resident’s ability to obtain personal jurisdiction for
Internet-related torts where the transaction of business is not involved.
Given their activist roles as glossators upon the long-arm statute,
however, the federal courts in Georgia would seem unlikely to let
express statutory language stand in the way of the exercise of personal
jurisdiction, given their assertion that the long-arm statute reaches to the
limits of due process. The question would become, however, as it does
with all judicial activism, how far are the federal courts willing to go in
their departure from the moorings of the legislated word? And it is this
question that raises a serious problem of indeterminacy in predicting with
any reasonable accuracy, the contours of internet-based personal
jurisdiction in diversity cases where Georgia law would provide the longarm statute for the service of the federal court’s process and upon which
the validity of the ultimate judgment under Full Faith and Credit
principles would depend.
The first internet-tort case in Georgia involving a nonresident
defendant was litigated in a federal court, which upheld personal
jurisdiction.176 In that case, the plaintiff, a computer consulting
corporation, entered into a consulting agreement with the defendant
trucking corporation, which was located in California.177 In providing the
service, the corporations “repeatedly used their respective computer
systems to interface and exchange information.”178 When the plaintiff
demanded payment, the defendant corporation terminated the plaintiff’s
176
Peridyne Tech. Solutions, L.L.C. v. Matheson Fast Freight, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d
1366 (N.D. Ga. 2000). Plaintiff’s counsel stated in an interview that the “ruling mark[ed]
the beginning of Internet case law in Georgia.” R. Robin McDonald, Internet Reach
Allows Calif. Firm to be Sued Here, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORTER., Oct. 19, 2000, at
1.
177
Peridyne Technology, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1368.
178
Id. at 1369.
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services, and an employee of the defendant corporation allegedly hacked
into the plaintiff’s computer system, inflicting damage on the plaintiff’s
server and, inter alia, stealing and deleting files.179 The plaintiff brought
several state law claims and federal computer fraud claims against the
corporation and employee. Defendants, predictably, challenged whether
the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over them by means
of service effectuated pursuant to the Georgia long-arm statute.180 The
court went straight to a due process analysis, stating that the Georgia
long-arm statute had been construed to reach the limits of due process.181
The court first noted “that the defendants should not be permitted to take
advantage of modern technology via the Internet or other electronic
means to escape traditional notions of jurisdiction.”182 In upholding
personal jurisdiction, the court emphasized the location of the servers in
Georgia as a key factor to a characterization of the tortious activity as
having “occurred” in Georgia, and, based on that characterization, ruled
consequently that the “plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the
defendants’ activities, albeit largely electronic, directed at Georgia.”183
A federal court holding that would seemingly allow for personal
jurisdiction in internet-related “defamation” actions was given in Horsley
v. Feldt.184 That case, as previously discussed,185 allowed personal
jurisdiction in a defamation action involving defamatory remarks on
television.186 The Horsley court, however, also approvingly cited a
Virginia federal district court’s finding of personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident who posted defamatory remarks on a website which caused
reputational harm to the Virginia plaintiff in Virginia where he lived and
worked.187 Therefore, it seems likely that the Georgia federal courts
would do the same, despite the defamation exclusion of subsection (2).188
179

Id.
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1371 (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell. Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir.
1997) (internal quotations omitted).
183
Id. at 1372. The Georgia state courts would likely now also uphold personal
jurisdiction under subsection (1), since the claims arose out of the employer’s transaction
of business in the state with the plaintiff.
184
128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
185
Id. See also supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
186
This outcome should now be the same in Georgia’s state courts, since the claim
arose from the transaction of business, thus allowing the newly expanded subsection (1)
to be employed.
187
Horsley, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68
F. Supp. 2d 692, 702 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
188
The Virginia case did not involve the transaction of business, so in Georgia such a
case would require application of subsection (2). Georgia’s state courts would then have
to apply the defamation exception and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
180

2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century

383

Yet, just because the federal courts have ruled first on these
internet-based personal jurisdiction issues does not, of course, bind the
Georgia courts. Indeed, under Erie principles, Georgia courts—as they
have done in the past in other long-arm jurisdiction issues—may decide
that the legislated language of the long-arm statute affords a narrower
scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction in internet-based cases. Likewise, the
rulings of individual district court judges do not actually bind the district
court to follow these interpretations of the long-arm statute in future
cases, no matter how advisable it may be for the district court to do so.
And until the Eleventh Circuit weighs in on the scope of internet-based
personal jurisdiction under Georgia law, there may well be considerable
indeterminacy in the scope of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction
countenanced by federal courts in internet-based cases. Thus, even under
the best of circumstances, leaving the development of internet-based
personal jurisdiction law to ad hoc, case-by-case glosses or on
“applications” of a telephone-and-mimeograph-era categorical long-arm
statute invites a level of indeterminate and expensive, contour-setting
litigation that militates strongly for a complete reconceptualization of the
long-arm statute by the Georgia legislature. That reconceptualization
should start with a firm rejection of a “patchwork” regime that is
incompatible with the rapidly evolving Internet world. After the recent
holding by the Georgia Supreme Court, the Legislature should take the
opportunity to exchange the old “patched-up” statute for one that
provides due-process-limits protection to residents while providing
guidance for principled, fair and predictable outcomes rooted in the
fundamental rules established in International Shoe.
In the next two sections, the authors walk through the
reconceptualization and legislation that they believe are needed to
resolve the inconsistencies and indeterminacy they have exposed in
Section II. A proposed long-arm statute that would do much to minimize
inconsistencies and eliminate indeterminacy is discussed in Section IV.
The visual reconceptualization of long-arm jurisdiction from which the
model long-arm is derived is explored in Section III.
III. VISUAL RECONCEPTUALIZATION
Thus far, we have explained the operation of typical long-arm
statutes at the rule-based level. Looking at specific cases decided under
our chosen long-arm statute examples (i.e., Georgia’s), we have
established the unnecessary deficiencies of the old-style categorical longarm statutes. The authors’ evaluations have been made from the
assumption that the statutes would operate better—more efficiently and
fairly—if they reached to the limits of due process. Before proceeding
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further to deal with the practical implications of our claim, the authors
believe it is appropriate to establish more than the proposition that a dueprocess-limits approach to long-arm statutes will produce “better
outcomes,” for better-outcomes rationales offer only an instrumentalist
perspective. As one of the authors has argued elsewhere,
“instrumentalism is insufficient to meet our long-term jurisprudential
needs.”189 Thus, the authors also believe it is necessary to establish that
due-process-limits personal jurisdiction is supported at a higher level of
principle—the important concepts that underlie every legitimate legal
rule. The due-process-based long-arm jurisprudence of International
Shoe is strongly supported by the relevant underlying principles, as we
demonstrate below.190
The analytic framework for discerning the foundation of juridical
jurisdiction, commonly called “personal jurisdiction,” is focused on a
single word encapsulating manifold and interlaced concepts, issues, and
policies: power.191 The power in question is that “of a state to apply its
189

Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony Of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin’s PrincipleRule Distinction To Reconceptualize Metaphorically A Substance-Procedure Dissonance
Exemplified By Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals In International Product Injury
Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 427-428 (2004) [hereinafter Van Detta, The Irony of
Instrumentalism].
190
Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189; Jeffrey A. Van Detta,
Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-of-Court-Access Approach to Replace Forum
Non Conveniens in Five International Product-Injury Case Studies, 24 NW. J. INT’L. L. &
BUS. 53 (2003) [hereinafter Van Detta, Justice Restored].
191
John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of Professor
Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591 (1995);
TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 164. The origins of modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine are rooted in “the concept that governments had territorial power over persons
and things within their boundaries.” TEPLEY & WHITTEN, supra note 6, at 125. This is
reflected in the most famous personal jurisdiction opinion of them all, Pennoyer v. Neff.
95 U.S. 714 (1878). See Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of
Stephen J. Field, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 75 (1997). In Pennoyer, Justice Field made it
clear that his “territorial rule” is based on the enterprise regulation principle:
To prevent any misapplication of the views expressed in this opinion, it
is proper to observe that we do not mean to assert, by anything we have
said, that a State may not authorize proceedings to determine the Status of
one of its citizens towards a non-resident . . . . The jurisdiction which every
State possesses to determine the civil status and capacities of all its
inhabitants involves authority to prescribe the conditions on which
proceedings affecting them may be commenced and carried on . . . .
. . . Nor do we doubt that a State, on creating corporations or other
institutions for pecuniary or charitable purposes, may provide a mode in
which their conduct may be investigated, their obligations enforced, or their
charters revoked . . . .
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 734-35. The American model of personal jurisdiction that arose
with Pennoyer has come under attack from numerous scholars, particularly on the
constitutionalization of personal jurisdiction doctrine. It is true that the doctrine is less
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local law.”192 The classic expression of state power is the minimum
contacts rules articulated in International Shoe v. Washington.193 Those
rules are based on the internal structure of the litigation — they describe
a fixed number of scenarios based on an internal structure composed of
facts about the defendant, the litigation, and the forum.194 The
relationship among this triumvirate of variables can conveniently be
called a litigation event,195 and the litigation event is created by the
common intersection at their domains, as illustrated on the following
page by Diagram 1.

than perfect, and that the Supreme Court’s struggle to articulate workable common-law
jurisdictional rules has left analytic holes and excessive judicial intervention due to the
heavily factual nature of the multi-factored legal tests that courts employ. However,
efforts to separate personal jurisdiction from the regulatory powers of the state, as much
of the scholarship in this area of late has been devoted to attempting, is misplaced. For
example, some commentators see Pennoyer’s influence differently—as undermining
rather than strengthening personal jurisdiction law by placing the defendant’s in forum
physical presence in a posture of primacy. Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 219092 (1997). In terms of defendants located outside of the forum, this is certainly true, but
that observation is insufficient to undermine the territorial personal jurisdiction. To the
contrary, the territorial principle still has validity for if it is not the defendant’s contacts
that justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then it may be the plaintiff’s contacts—
i.e., residence in and injury in the state—that give rise to the kinds of regulatory interests
that justify application of jurisdiction and substantive law. Van Detta, The Irony of
Instrumentalism, supra note 187, at 472 n.125. Pennoyer and the sovereignty model of
personal jurisdiction continue to be the theoretical underpinnings that justify the core of
most assertions of jurisdiction by state courts. See Stewart Jay, “Minimum Contacts” as a
Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C. L. REV. 429, 434, 473
(1981) (International Shoe is neither an exception to nor an overruling of Pennoyer, but
is “representative of a different basis for approaching jurisdiction”); Arthur M. Weisburd,
Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985) (arguing
that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises of sovereignty, limits on judicial
power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of the states). But see Harold S.
Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sovereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the
Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 735-36 (1983)
(criticizing the role of sovereignty and state interests in personal jurisdiction doctrine).
192
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24 (1971).
193
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
194
Id. at 317-18.
195
For a complete discussion of the nature and significance of the concept of
“litigation event,” see Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 44147.
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DIAGRAM 1
Constitutional Limits on Personal Jurisdiction: The Domain of Minimum
Contacts196

FORUM

X
DEFENDANT

LITIGATION

Significant contact or aggregation of contacts.

196
See Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945); Patricia Youngblood,
Constitutional Constraints on Choice of Law: The Nexus Between World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 50 ALB. L. REV. 1, 3-11
(1985).
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The intersection of the three fact domains in a common domain of
overlapping operative facts produces a subset of minimum contact facts
that create a litigation event and have significance for the operation of
juridical jurisdiction rules. As Professor Youngblood pointed out in
1985, International Shoe “identified two jurisdictional variables of
primary relevance” that function as the basis for the minimum contacts
rules: [1] “the quantity or frequency of the defendant’s forum acts”
which “distinguishes continuous and systematic forum contacts from
single or occasional forum contacts”; and [2] “the relationship these acts
bear to the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues.”197
There are four possible combinations for describing the litigation
event using these variables, as Professor Youngblood illustrated using
the graphic metaphor of the Cartesian coordinate plane represented in
Diagram 2.198 Diagram 3 illustrates that each of the four quadrants of
Professor Youngblood’s Cartesian metaphor is an archetypical litigation
event to which one of the four general rules articulated in the
International Shoe opinion directly corresponds.

197
198

Youngblood, supra note 196, at 5.
Id. at 6.
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DIAGRAM 2
Cartesian Metaphor for Personal Jurisdiction Rules199

199

CONTINUOUS & SYSTEMATIC

CONNECTED

UNCONNECTED

QUADRANT I

QUADRANT III

Continuous & Systematic
Contact

Continuous & Systematic
Contact (Quantity Focus)
&

&
Connected Cause of
Action

QUADRANT II

SINGLE OR OCCASIONAL

TYPE OF CONTACT

CAUSE OF ACTION

Single or Occasional
Contact (Quantity Focus)
&
Connected Cause of
Action (Quality Focus)

Youngblood, supra note 196, at 6.

Unconnected Cause of
Action (Quality Focus)

QUADRANT IV

Single or Occasional
Contact
&
Unconnected Cause of
Action
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DIAGRAM 3
Detailed Cartesian Metaphor for Personal Jurisdiction: Correlation with
International Shoe200
CAUSE OF ACTION
CONNECTED

200

CONTINUOUS & SYSTEMATIC

Continuous & Systematic
Contact & Connected Cause
of Action
“‘Presence’ in the state . . .
has never been doubted when
the activities of the
corporation there have not
only been continuous and
systematic, but also give rise
to the liabilities sued on. . . .”
326 U.S. at 317.

QUADRANT II

SINGLE OR OCCASIONAL

TYPE OF CONTACT

QUADRANT I

Single or Occasional Contact
(Quantity Focus) &
Connected Cause of Action
(Quality Focus)
“[T]he commission of some
single or occasional acts . . .
because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances
of their commission, may be
deemed sufficient to render the
corporation liable to suit.” 326
U.S. at 318 (citations omitted)

UNCONNECTED
QUADRANT III
Continuous & Systematic Contact
(Quantity Focus)
& Unconnected Cause of Action
(Quality Focus)
“[T]here have been instances in
which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a
nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.” 326 U.S. at 318.

QUADRANT IV
Single or Occasional Contact
& Unconnected Cause of Action
“Conversely it has been generally
recognized that the casual presence
of the corporate agent or even his
conduct of single or isolated items
of activities in a state in the
corporation’s behalf are not enough
to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the
activities there.” 326 U.S. at 317
(citations omitted).

(emphasis added).

Correlation legend between quadrants and rules as stated in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Professor Youngblood notes that litigation events in Quadrants I or
IV “compel[] a particular conclusion” about whether the litigation event
falls within the rules of juridical jurisdiction.201 By contrast, she observes
that litigation events within Quadrant II or III sit in gray areas of the
rules:
[T]here exists one supporting and one debilitating jurisdictional
factor. In Quadrant II cases, involving single or occasional acts
and a cause of action connected to those acts, the propriety of the
jurisdictional exercise will depend upon the quality of the
defendant’s forum acts. In Quadrant III, the constitutional
propriety of a jurisdictional exercise . . . depends upon the
quantity of the defendant’s forum [connections].202

Significantly, the forum court may assert jurisdiction where a corporate
defendant is incorporated in the forum, makes its headquarters in the
forum, or “does”—rather than merely “transacts”—“business” in the
forum.203 Professor Youngblood’s graphic depiction of the litigation
201

Youngblood, supra note 196, at 7.
Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted).
203
International Shoe instructs us that a Quadrant III analysis becomes transformed
into a conclusion of general jurisdiction when corporate activities become “so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities.” 326 U.S. at 318. General jurisdiction exists when
the forum state has “a regulatory relationship with the defendant sufficient to justify
jurisdiction over any and all claims.” Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business
With Doing Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 171, 171-72, 205 (2001).
Professor Twitchell notes that “doing business” jurisdiction is a form of general personal
jurisdiction that applies when “the state would be justified in deciding a claim that is
wholly unrelated to the defendant’s forum contacts.” Id. at 172. General jurisdiction
clearly applies to the forum states in which a corporate defendant is either incorporated or
has its principal place of business. Id. at 171-72.
Professor Sarah Cebik has tied general jurisdiction over corporate defendants to
sovereign interests in regulating the conduct of a corporation which it incorporated,
which develops corporate policy within the forum (i.e., headquarters or autonomous
branch office functions), or which conducts “core activities” in the forum. Sarah R.
Cebik, A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery Inside an Enigma: General Personal Jurisdiction
and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33, 36, 40 (1998). This is another
way of saying that general jurisdiction based upon any of the three factual bundles
present in a litigation event is most persuasively supported by the enterprise regulation
principle. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 477 n.135. As
Professor Cebik describes it, “an ‘interest’ in the defendant [sufficient for general
jurisdiction] is legitimate if the state would have a reason to be concerned about the rights
and duties of the defendant under any circumstances.” Cebik, supra, at 33.
For other views of the scope and application of the general jurisdiction rule, see,
for example, Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 723 (1988); Friedrick K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2001); Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate
Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 722, 741, 758
202
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event as rules of juridical jurisdiction is firmly rooted at the level of
principle.204 Indeed, each of the rules depicted by the four Quadrants
directly corresponds to the interaction of the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles.205 The principles apply to the basic
(1987) (finding close connection between “doing business” general jurisdiction and the
most significant interest test for applying forum law).
204
Burnham v. Superior Court implicitly recognized the significance of the enterprise
regulation principle for the rules of juridical jurisdiction:
[A] “totality of the circumstances” test [] guarantee[s] what traditional
territorial rules of jurisdiction were designed precisely to avoid: uncertainty
and litigation over the preliminary issue of the forum’s competence. It may
be that those evils, necessarily accompanying a freestanding
“reasonableness” inquiry, must be accepted at the margins, when we
evaluate nontraditional forms of jurisdiction newly adopted by the States.
But that is no reason for injecting them into the core of our American
practice, exposing to such a “reasonableness” inquiry the ground of
jurisdiction that has hitherto been considered the very baseline of
reasonableness, physical presence.
495 U.S. 604, 626-27 (1990) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The physical presence
of the defendant in a forum that forms “the very baseline of reasonableness” (to use
language of personal jurisdiction) explains the power of the finding that a defendant is
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. Id. at 627. Assignment of a “litigation
event” to the rule of Quadrants I, II, or III and satisfaction of that rule is more than a
conclusion that a court is empowered to hear a particular dispute. It is also a finding that
the state’s substantive law may regulate the actions of the parties. The stronger the case
for personal jurisdiction, the stronger the case for applying the forum state’s law. James
Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872; Courtland H.
Peterson, Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 869 (1981); Youngblood, supra note 196, at 50-51. Indeed, as Professor
Youngblood has observed, there are a “myriad of values . . . linking judicial and
legislative jurisdiction.” Youngblood, supra note 196, at 38. As Professor Korn has
observed, “[i]n the United States, . . . the permissible extrastate reach of each state’s law
is circumscribed by federal constitutional limitations—analogous to those governing the
reach of its judicial jurisdiction—commonly referred to as constraints on each state’s
‘legislative jurisdiction.’” Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice
of Law in Multistate Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2196 (1997). Professor Stein has
defined legislative jurisdiction as “[t]he sphere of a state’s substantive rule making
authority, its ‘legislative jurisdiction,’” and notes that legislative jurisdiction “is tied to its
interest in regulating activity within its borders.” Stein, supra note 201, at 742.
205
In this sense, personal jurisdiction doctrine leads cleanly to an underlying
observation that connects personal jurisdiction to regulatory power via the due process
clause. Indeed, “a forum’s assertion of jurisdiction constitute[s] the imposition of its
sovereign’s regulatory machinery.” See, e.g., Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A
Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249,
273-76 (1991); Philip F. Cramer, Note, Constructing Alternative Avenues of
Jurisdictional Protection: Bypassing Burnham’s Roadblock Via § 1404(A), 53 VAND. L.
REV. 311, 325-26 (2000) (discussing “a unified theory of jurisdiction based on the idea of
jurisdiction as not place but rather the imposition of a regulatory regime”); see also Harry
B. Cummins, Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in
Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1963); Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism In the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV.
689 (1987); Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63
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human areas of endeavor that produce the three broad categories of civil
law subjects out of which a plethora of most modern non-criminal law
grow: torts, contracts, and property law. Moreover, these principles are
sufficiently generous in scope to take within them both individual, as
well as corporate and other business associational, activities that
typically give rise to issues and claims classifiable under long-recognized
divisions of tort law, contract law, property law, or combinations of
them. By far, however, the greatest significance of both long-arm statutes
as well as these principles lies in their application to claims that are
rooted in business activity – particularly the commerce of the most
prevalent business associations of them all, the corporation, in its
dealings with business entities, groups, individuals, and the public
generally.
Corrective justice is the “principle that requires compensating
individuals for injury caused to their persons and property when
corporations engage in commercial activity that creates a nonreciprocal
risk to those individuals.”206 Enterprise regulation is the “principle that
sovereigns should regulate conduct of corporations that they either create
or assist by fostering a business environment in which corporations may
operate.”207 These two principles are related in that “[t]he enterprise
WASH. U. L.Q. 377 (1985) (arguing that, because assertions of jurisdiction are exercises
of sovereignty, limits on judicial power must be derived from limits on the sovereignty of
the states). This “unified standard for both general and specific jurisdiction not only
recognizes that imposition of the appropriate regulatory regime should be the real issue,
but it also acknowledges the merging of choice of jurisdiction with choice of law.”
Cramer, 53 VAND. L. REV. at 333. Included in this “machinery” is the substantive law
(including choice of law rules) that implement the state’s legislative policies—the very
fabric that controls the conduct of the state’s individual and corporate citizens. Professor
Heiser has effectively summarized this relationship as the natural implication of the
multi-branch system of government in the American model:
[T]he assertion of personal jurisdiction is not merely the assertion of the
right to decide a case between the parties at a given geographical location.
Rather, as Maier and McCoy explain, the selection of the forum is the
selection of an “entire decision-making regime.” Constitutional controls on
personal jurisdiction, Maier and McCoy astutely observe, “determine the
legitimacy of the forum as a decision maker and thus the legitimacy of
imposing that forum’s policy choices” on the parties. What is at stake in the
constitutional restriction on personal jurisdiction is whether it is unfair for
the forum to select and apply the legal policies that will govern the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the cause of action.
Convenience in terms of geographic location is not much of a concern, and
will be increasingly less so as technology makes interstate litigation even
easier than it already is.
Walter W. Heiser, A “Minimum Interest” Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 915, 935-37 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
206
Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 442.
207
Id. at 442–43.

2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century

393

regulation principle makes it legitimate for a sovereign to act to affect the
corrective justice principle.”208 While their interaction implicates both
substantive and procedural rules,209 of interest to us is how this
interaction corresponds to the procedural rules of personal jurisdiction—
namely, that a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only if
the forum sovereign has a legitimate interest in regulating the
defendant’s conduct.
The correspondence between the four Quadrants and the interaction
of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principle is effectively
illustrated in Diagram 4. In Quadrant I, each litigation event falls within
the domains of both the corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principles. In contrast, Quadrant IV comprises those litigation events
within the domain of the corrective justice principle, but outside of the
enterprise regulation principle—in other words, the plaintiff has suffered
a wrong, but the forum in question cannot adjudicate or remedy the
wrong. Significantly, the two “gray area” litigation events described by
Quadrant II and III sit on the limbs of intersection between the domain of
the corrective justice and the enterprise regulation principles. As limbdwellers, those litigation events in Quadrant II or III may fall either
inside the common domain of the two principles210—or outside of the
208

Id. at 443.
Id. at 441.
210
The personal jurisdiction rules of International Shoe already imbed a shorthand
forum non conveniens analysis—not as elaborate as the Gilbert factors but directed at the
same kind of facts. See Jacquelyn Duval-Major, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
650, 664-65 & nn.105-20 (1992); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 803-05 & nn.88-92
(1985); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1266 & nn.23-117 (1986). As to Quadrant III cases where
corporations are sued in a home state, however, Chief Justice Stone clearly assumed that
no FNC-type analysis would apply when a corporation was sued where it resides. An
“‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corporation from a trial away
from its ‘home’ or principal place of business is relevant” to determine whether the
demand the court makes based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum “make it
reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit” in the forum. Int’l
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). Indeed, it is quite plausible that the
convenience factors were not meant to come into play when minimum contacts are
established in Quadrants II and III. To the contrary, the convenience factors do not
“short-circuit” the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases where there are minimum
contacts. The convenience factors merely function as a means of articulating why a
Quadrant II or III case that does not present sufficient forum contacts not be dismissed
because such cases fall outside of the domain illustrated in Diagram 1. So complete is the
analysis under the convenience branch that Professor Heiser observes that sufficient
minimum contacts for sovereignty purposes generally guarantee that there will be no
“manifest and grave” inconvenience, and that the convenience branch analysis effectively
renders the FNC analysis moot:
209
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common domain and solely within the corrective justice principle’s
domain.

In light of the current level of communication and litigation technology,
such due process violations should rarely occur. Inconvenience to the
defendant should only be sufficient to defeat personal jurisdiction on an
individualized basis, but does not provide justification for broad invalidating
rules such as “minimum contacts.”
Heiser, supra note 205, at 935-36.
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DIAGRAM 4
Conceptualization of Litigation Events as Principles Mapped to
Juridical Jurisdiction Rules
DIAGRAM 4: CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
Enterprise
Regulation AS
EVENTS
PRINCIPLES
MAPPED
TO
Principle
JURISDICTION
RULES
Domain

LITIGATION
Corrective
JURIDICAL
Justice
Principle

Litigation Event Operative Facts

Litigation Events
that Actuate Only
the Regulatory

CONTINUOUS &
SYSTEMATIC CONTACT

SINGLE OR OCCASIONAL
CONTACT

X

Dworkian
Principles
Universe

CONNECTED
CAUSE OF ACTION

UNCONNECTED
CAUSE OF ACTION

QUADRANT I

QUADRANT III

Continuous & Systematic
Contact & Connected Cause of
Action

Continuous & Systematic Contact
& Unconnected Cause of Action

QUADRANT II

QUADRANT IV

Single or Occasional Contact &
Connected Cause of Action

Single or Occasional Contact &
Unconnected Cause of Action

Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of Corrective Justice
Principle, but outside domain of Enterprise Regulation Principle—Maps to
Cartesian (Quadrant IV).
Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of both Corrective Justice
and Enterprise Regulation Principles—Maps to Cartesian (Quadrant I).

X

Falls on limb of intersection between domains of Enterprise Regulation and
Corrective Justice Principles—May fall outside Enterprise Regulation Principle
Domain depending on [1] Quality and/or [2] Quantity of minimum contacts
(Quadrants II and III).
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IV. MODEL LONG-ARM STATUTE
A. Option For Reform: Why a Due-Process-Limits Long-Arm Statute
Guided by Predicted-Outcome Rules of International Shoe is the Better
Choice
It is evident from the reconceptualization in Section III that at the
level of principled theory, long-arm jurisdiction practiced within the
parameters of International Shoe serves critical state interests. The
state’s interests in providing a forum to protect its citizens from harm, or
to at least secure compensation for their injuries and to regulate business
activity affecting their citizens, have their theoretical underpinnings in
the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles. As we have
demonstrated, the International Shoe approach to long-arm jurisdiction is
an elegant and congruent expression of those principles through positive
law. Therefore, rather than continuing to build long-arm statutes on
outdated proto-models211 (such as the classic Illinois, New York, and
Georgia long-arm statutes), or to open long-arm jurisdiction to the limits
of due process without specific statutory guidance as to what those limits
are (forcing litigants to divine limits from Delphic appeals courts
pronouncements on an ad hoc basis), the authors advance a different
211
Some commentators argue for a return to categorical-based long-arms. Professor
McFarland concludes that the better policy choice is for states to adopt categorical longarm statutes. McFarland, supra note 3, at 536-37. However, as we showed in Section II,
supra, the states desire to exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process.
Therefore, it does not make sense to limit long-arm statutes to specifically enumerated
categories which will inevitably cause unfair results for a resident plaintiff as the
categorical approach fails to keep up with new circumstances and rapidly evolving
Internet-based technologies. Nor do we concur that the only other available option is to
“adopt the worst of both worlds by adding a catch-all, no-limits clause to an enumeratedacts long-arm statute.” Id. at 537. A state should, instead, have a due-process-limits longarm statute with principled-based guidance for its application.
Other scholars have proposed recently not merely a return to categorical long-arm
statutes, but would seek to federalize this approach to establish uniformity. Accordingly,
these writers propose using a draft Hague treaty as the model for a federal statute which
all states would be required by Congress to adopt. KEVIN M. CLERMONT & KUO-CHANG
HUANG, Converting the Draft Hague Treaty into Domestic Jurisdictional Law, in A
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 191 (John J.
Barcelo III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., Kluwer Law International 2005). In addition to
the reasons already discussed for not perpetuating categorical long-arm statutes, this
proposal has additional drawbacks when examined through the lens of federalism. Not
only would the states be giving up control over a traditionally state procedural matter to
the federal government, but they would be doing so based on a treaty involving
compromises with and among other nations. In essence, foreign preferences in
international personal jurisdiction would end up dictating purely interstate personal
jurisdiction matters (where there is no foreign-citizen defendant involved). It is doubtful
that states would be agreeable to such a loss of sovereignty, nor that it would address the
enterprise regulation and corrective justice needs examined above.
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approach. That approach is to create a long-arm statute that in its terms
embodies the relevant limits, considerations, and factors that define the
limits of due process, as distilled from the jumble of decided cases.
Here, for example is how such a twenty-first century statute might
be drafted in Georgia:
Title 9, Chapter 10, of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, as
codified, shall be amended to add a new section to be numbered
“9-10-100.” The text of 9-10-100 follows:
9-10-100 [1]: It shall be the policy of the State of Georgia that
jurisdiction under this section shall be exercised to the limits
provided under due process as delineated by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.212
9-10-100 [2]: Definitions:
A. Prejudice shall mean that the defendant cannot enjoy the
opportunity to present a defense that satisfies the minimum
standards of due process of law in the U.S. Constitution. To
demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must by a preponderance of
the evidence establish that it would be a manifest miscarriage of
justice for trial to be held in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. In order
to establish such a manifest miscarriage, defendant must show
that:
1. It would be deprived of access to evidence
necessary to preserve a substantial right; or
2. The cost of the litigation in the forum is so
disproportionate to the defendant’s financial and
physical resources that defendant would be deprived
of the opportunity to be heard; or
212

Of course, some state constitutions may have been construed to provide greater
due-process protections than those afforded under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions
defining the contours of federal due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
If that is the case in a particular state, the legislature would need to take two additional
steps. First, evaluate case law to determine whether state due process rights have been
invoked to protect nonresident defendants from overreaching exercise of personal
jurisdiction by that state’s courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Comment, Compelling
State Interest Jurisprudence of the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50
ALB. L. REV. 675 (1986) (discussing state constitutions as independent sources of
government protection of individual rights, and the potential for greater protection
sometimes afforded in state constitutions). Second, if state due process is found to figure
into the jurisdictional equation, then a legislature would need to decide how to craft this
section to address the level of due process, or similar, state constitutional protection
afforded to nonresidents who find themselves defending a case in the courts of that state.
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3. The forum state has no legitimate, regulatory
interest in the defendant’s conduct that might be
advanced by adjudication in the forum; or
4. It would violate the defendant’s rights under an
international treaty ratified by the United States or to
which the United States is a signatory.
In determining prejudice to the defendant of a trial in the forum,
the fact there may be other fora in which the action may be filed
shall be accorded no consideration.
B. Minimum contacts shall mean the operative facts that describe
a relationship between the defendant and the forum. These
operative facts are those that define “the litigation event,” which
includes all of the facts out of which the relationship between the
defendant, the forum, and the cause of action arose.
C. Defendant shall mean a non-resident natural person or
juridical entity who is not a citizen or resident of the State of
Georgia at the time a lawsuit is commenced in a state or federal
court in Georgia.
D. Cause of action shall mean any set of facts admissible in
evidence that creates a claim for relief under applicable law.
E. Arising out of, when used in reference to a cause of action in
this section, shall refer to the circumstances in which a
defendant’s minimum contacts form the common set of operative
facts, the litigation event, that also give rise to the plaintiff’s
cause of action.
F. Every use of the masculine pronoun shall include the feminine
pronoun.
9-10-100 [3] Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction by the Courts of
this State Over Defendants Neither Resident In Nor Served
Within the State
A. General Rule of Court Access
In all civil cases, a court of the State of Georgia —
(i) may exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant
consistent
with
the
sovereignty
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requirements of the U.S. Constitution as expressed in
Section 3.B, infra; and
(ii) shall not dismiss a case under this section unless
the defendant makes one of the showings specified in
Section 3.C, infra.
B. Minimum Contacts and Limits of State Sovereignty Over
Defendants
1. In all cases in which it is shown a defendant has
systematic and continuous minimum contacts with the
forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more causes
of action arising out of those contacts, it is
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state
have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
2. In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant
has only single or occasional minimum contacts with
the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more
causes of action arising out of those contacts, a
presumption arises that defendant is subject to
personal jurisdiction in the courts of the state. The
defendant may rebut that presumption through
admissible evidence that clearly and convincingly
dispels this presumption to the satisfaction of the
forum court.
3. In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant
has continuous and systematic minimum contacts
with the forum state, and plaintiff’s cause of action
does not arise out of those contacts, the inquiry shall
be whether the defendant’s activities physically
within a state, or directed to persons within the state
by electronic communications, are so substantial and
of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities. Personal jurisdiction shall be found
when the plaintiff—
i. establishes that defendant is either incorporated in
the forum or maintains a principal residence, a
functional headquarters, or a branch office in the
forum; or
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ii. establishes that the defendant’s contacts with the
forum demonstrate that defendant has engaged in such
a continuous and systematic course of “doing
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion
that it is virtually present in the forum; or
iii. establishes that one of his causes of action are
related to the defendant’s forum contacts and
defendant would not be prejudiced by maintenance of
the entire suit within the forum.
4.
In all cases in which it is shown that a defendant
has only single or occasional minimum contacts with
the forum and the plaintiff’s cause of action does not
arise out of those facts, the absence of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant is established as a
matter of law.
5.
The showings described in this section shall be
made by a preponderance of admissible evidence,
except as specifically stated otherwise.
C. Grounds for Dismissal Upon Defendant’s Showing of
Prejudice
1. In all cases in which a defendant has systematic and
continuous minimum contacts with the forum and the
plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of action
arising out of those contacts, it is conclusively
presumed that defendant cannot establish prejudice
and that personal jurisdiction may properly be
exercised.
2. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or
occasional minimum contacts with the forum and the
plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of action
arising out of those contacts, a presumption arises that
defendant is not prejudiced by the maintenance of
action in the forum and that personal jurisdiction may
properly be exercised. The defendant may rebut that
presumption through admissible evidence that clearly
and convincingly establishes prejudice.
3. In all cases in which a defendant has continuous
and systematic minimum contacts with the forum and
plaintiff’s cause of action does not arise out of those
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contacts, a presumption arises that defendant is
prejudiced by maintenance of the action in the forum
and that personal jurisdiction is therefore not properly
exercised. The plaintiff may rebut that presumption
through admissible evidence that:
i. establishes that defendant is either incorporated in
the forum or maintains a principal residence, a
functional headquarters, or a branch office in the
forum; or
ii. establishes that the defendant’s contacts with the
forum demonstrate that defendant has engaged in such
a continuous and systematic course of “doing
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion
that it is virtually present in the forum; or
iii. establishes that one of his causes of action are
related to the defendant’s forum contacts and
defendant would not be prejudiced by maintenance of
the suit within the forum.
4. In all cases in which a defendant has only single or
occasional minimum contacts with the forum and the
plaintiff’s cause of action do not arise out of those
facts, prejudice to defendant requiring dismissal of the
case shall be conclusively presumed.
5.
The showings described in this section shall be
made by a preponderance of admissible evidence,
except as specifically stated otherwise.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 9-10-100
Comment to Section 9-10-100[2]A: The definition of prejudice
is a consolidation of the factors given in the “convenience”
branch (“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”)
of the International Shoe test as articulated in World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and tweaked, for
international elements, by Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The intent is
to make more concise and coherent the factors given in those two
cases, based on the notion that the real point of the
“convenience” branch of International Shoe (as delineated by
Justice White in World-Wide Volkswagen) is not really so much
“reasonableness” or “convenience” or “traditional notions, etc.”,
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but that it instead boils down to prejudice. The prejudice factors
given in this section also incorporate the overlapping factors
from forum non conveniens analysis, recognizing that both
analyses are essentially the same. As one commentator noted,
because the forum non conveniens
private and public interest factors, taken together,
overlap to a large degree with the reasonableness
factors from the personal jurisdiction test, as
articulated by the [United States Supreme] Court . . .
it would appear that the court is required in nearly all
cases to apply the same factors twice; once as part of
the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and again as part of
the forum non conveniens balancing test.213
Comment to Section 9-10-100[2]B: Traditionally, minimum
contacts have been defined instrumentally by the concept of
purposeful availment. For example, synthesizing much case law
on the subject, it appears that courts count defendant-forum
contacts as “minimum contacts” where it was reasonably
foreseeable to the defendant that the defendant’s conduct would
affect a person, business entity, property, or another legally
protected interest within the forum. However, such terminology
misfocuses the inquiry. It suggests that the courts must divine the
intent of the defendant in creating contacts, and must apply a torttype standard of foreseeability in deciding whether a connection
between the defendant and the forum state should be classified as
“foreseeably” affecting an interest in the forum state. We,
however, think that such inquiries border on the metaphysical,
and they import tort-type notions of proximate cause into an
inquiry where they are inappropriate. Proximate cause seeks to
impose judicial policy-making limits on the extent of tort
liability, by, in effect, cutting off the natural consequences of a
factual cause analysis by empowering fact-finders to declare that
causation, although logically linked, must be cut off at some
point, on the grounds of an amorphous and ill-defined policy on
limiting liability. Concomitantly, importing that standard into
personal jurisdiction analysis has the effect of deflecting the
inquiry to a mode of constricting jurisdiction in all civil cases on
the basis of a tort-type policy limitation for liability. This is
inappropriate. In fact, it gives double-duty, in torts cases, and
consequential damages cases in contract law, to a proximate
213
Lonny Hoffman, Forum Non Conveniens—State and Federal Movements, ALIABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: CIVIL PROCEDURE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURT 441, 441 (Feb. 2002).
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cause analysis, which is already available to curtail liability in the
substantive phase of the case. It is inappropriate to deny plaintiffs
a forum on that basis, particularly since personal jurisdiction is
primarily based on two concepts that are connected, yet in
constant tension: [1] the convergence of the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles and [2] the avoidance of
unbearable prejudice on non-resident defendants. That tension is
best resolved on the basis of treating all contacts as relevant
under the “litigation event” approach, rather than isolating certain
contacts from the litigation event as determinative and elevating
them in importance over the cumulative effect of the whole and
disadvantaging the plaintiff if those particular paradigm facts
don’t fall within a zone of foreseeability. It is more appropriate to
find a broad power of personal jurisdiction when the entire
factual scenario points to appropriate exercise of personal
jurisdiction, without superimposing substantive law concepts of
liability limitation through the importation of a pseudo-proximate
cause standard into the personal jurisdiction analysis. Rather, that
question is better addressed in the forum courts as part of the
“merits” of the claims themselves by means of traditional
proximate cause analysis, which relates more to foreseeability of
extent of liability, rather than of being haled into court. That is
not to say the foreseeability is not a component of personal
jurisdiction under the due process clause; it is merely to say that
foreseeability is implicit in the treatment of minimum contacts as
defined by the litigation event concept, rather than by a parsing
analysis that allows courts to pick and choose carelessly or
inconsistently among facts in the litigation event, view them out
of context, and then make a plenary, outcome determinative
pronouncement that they are either “foreseeable” or
“unforeseeable” to a particular defendant. Such ad hoc
characterization unnecessarily introduces dissonance into
personal jurisdiction law, and provides an excessively prodefendant jurisprudence, when, in fact, as was demonstrated by
one of the authors in another writing,214 the contacts should be
viewed holistically as part of a larger bundle of facts we call “the
litigation event.”

214

Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189, at 443-44.
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V. APPLICATION TO REPRESENTATIVE CASES ORIGINALLY DECIDED
UNDER A CATEGORICAL LONG-ARM STATUTE
As Don Quixote is reported by Cervantes to have said once,
profoundly, “the proof of the pudding is in the eating.”215 Pointing out
the deficiencies in categorical long-arm statutes, extolling the virtues of
the International Shoe parameters as a principled antidote to the ills
caused by categorical long-arm statutes, and proposing a codification of
the due-process-limit rules set out in International Shoe but largely
overlooked or misunderstood by the courts, simply serves to set the table
for the work of this section. In this section, we eat our pudding by
examining the practical consequences of our work. We do this by
answering two questions: (1) Would our proposed long-arm statute make
a difference in cases in which personal jurisdiction would have been
constitutionally exercised—but was denied due to the doctrinal penury
inherent in categorical long-arm statutes? (2) If our proposal would make
a difference, what kind of difference would it make—and would this be a
desirable difference in outcomes?
In considering the second half of this second inquiry, we will make
specific reference to the corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principles discussed in Section III. Our operating premise is that the
Model Long-Arm statute will produce more than greater consistency and
predictability in litigation outcomes. It will also produce outcomes that
advance the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles upon
which the modern conceptualization of personal jurisdiction is
founded.216
In this section, the Model Long-Arm statute will be applied to
representative Georgia cases to illustrate how it should work in practice
to accomplish the goals of providing maximum exercise of personal
jurisdiction with guidance that allows for more predictable and consistent
jurisdiction determinations. The chosen cases are organized by the fourquadrant approach to reifying the International Shoe rules, which, as
discussed in Section III, supra, are derived directly from Chief Justice
Stone’s carefully chosen words. Within each quadrant, we will first
discuss the chosen case’s outcome under the Georgia long-arm statute
and then discuss the application of the Model Long-Arm statute,
explaining why each case was placed in that particular quadrant. The
four quadrants correspond to subsections [3](B)(1)-(4) of the Model
Long-Arm statute in Section IV, supra. Consequently, applying the
215

MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE, 419 (Peter Motteux trans.,
Random House 1941) (1615).
216
See supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Van Detta, The Irony of
Instrumentalism, supra note 189; Van Detta, Justice Restored, supra note 190.
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Model Long-Arm statute and placing each case within a particular
quadrant entails a two-part inquiry:217 (1) Whether the defendant’s forum
activities were continuous and systematic, or single or occasional—as
determined by the quantity and frequency of said forum activities; and
(2) whether or not the cause of action upon which the plaintiff sues arises
from those defendant forum activities. Once a case is placed in one of the
quadrants (or one of the subsections [3](B)(1)–(4)), then it must be
determined whether exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
“notions of fairplay and substantial justice.”218 This is accomplished in
the Model Long-Arm statute through application of subsections
[3](C)(1)-(3) and the definition of “prejudice” given in subsection [2](A).
Finally, following the Model Long-Arm statute application is a
discussion of how its application would advance both the principles of
corrective justice and enterprise regulation in the particular case.
The cases to be considered were selected based on the following
criteria:
1) Quadrants: representative cases that fit within each of the four
quadrants were selected.
2) Using the Georgia long-arm statute: the case must either have
been decided by a state court, or a federal court that applied the Georgia
long-arm statute (rather than going straight to a due process analysis), so
the differences with the Model Long-Arm statute could be illustrated.
3) Characterization of contacts: cases were selected where the
greater clarity of characterizing the quality and/or quantity of contacts,
and/or their relationship to the cause of action sued on, would have
produced either a different personal jurisdiction outcome, or articulated
the outcome in a clearer and more defensible basis to promote the
development of a more coherent and consistent course of assertion of
long-arm jurisdiction by Georgia courts.
Two cases from each of the four quadrants will be analyzed.
Diagram 5 illustrates within which quadrant each chosen case falls.

217
Derived from the “two jurisdictional variables of primary relevance” previously
discussed, supra note 197 and accompanying text.
218
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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DIAGRAM 5
Chosen Cases Plotted by Quadrant
CONNECTED
CONTINUOUS & SYSTEMATIC

QUADRANT I

QUADRANT III

Hollingsworth
v.
Cunard Line, Ltd..

Allstate Ins. Co.
v.
Klein

Griffin
v.
Air South, Inc.

Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.
v.
Sanders

QUADRANT II

SINGLE OR OCCASIONAL

UNCONNECTED

QUADRANT IV

Catholic Stewardship
Consultants, Inc.
v.
Ruotolo Associates, Inc.

Barton Southern Co., Inc.
v.
Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc.

Worthy
v.
Eller

Gee
v.
Reingold
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A. Quadrant I—Continuous and Systematic + Connected Cause of Action
Subsection [3](B)(1) of the Model Long-Arm corresponds to
Quadrant I. In such cases, the state’s interest in providing a forum for a
cause of action that occurred within the state against a defendant who has
substantial contacts with the state strongly implicates both the corrective
justice and enterprise regulation interests. The Georgia cases within this
quadrant uphold personal jurisdiction under the Georgia long-arm statute
because the cause of action arises from the defendant’s activities within
the state as required in the preamble of the long-arm. There are few
Georgia cases that fall within this quadrant, however. This is likely
because nonresident defendants that have continuous and systematic
contacts with Georgia are virtually always corporations, and such
corporations usually have obtained authorization to transact business in
the state.219 These corporations are not covered under Georgia’s long-arm
statute, because corporations authorized to transact business in Georgia
are specifically excluded from the definition of nonresident in the longarm statute—instead, they are considered to be resident foreign
corporations and, thus, amenable to service of process on any cause of
action like a resident.220 Thus, only those corporations that have
continuous and systematic activities within the state, but yet are not
required to register as doing business within the state are covered by
Georgia’s long-arm statute.
1. Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd.221
This case involved a breach of contract and fraud action against
defendant cruise line by plaintiffs due to lack of promised activities and
services on an around-the-world cruise.222
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
Because subsections (1) and (3) of the Georgia long-arm statute
were implicated, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that it “need only
consider whether the defendant transacted any business within the
state.”223 The court cited the three-pronged test by the Georgia Supreme

219

As required by GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1501 (West 2004).
See supra note 19 for discussion regarding corporations authorized to transact
business in Georgia and their treatment under the long-arm statute.
221
263 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
222
Id. at 192.
223
Id.
220
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Court from Davis Metals v. Allen,224 and also the policy from Coe &
Payne225 that personal jurisdiction be exercised over nonresidents to the
maximum extent allowed by due process of law.226 Consequently, the
court’s analysis under the long-arm amounted to a due process analysis.
The court detailed Cunard Line’s business activities within the state–the
advertising of the cruise in the state by a travel agency it hired, the use of
travel agencies within the state, the sending of ticket stock to those
agencies to print the contract tickets, and the sending of the contract to
residents within the state227—which established that it was transacting
business within the state. The court dismissed the notion that the
independent travel agencies used by Cunard Line insulated it from local
jurisdiction.228 The court also cited that portion of International Shoe
which we have used to define Quadrant I: “‘‘Presence’ in the state in this
sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation there
have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the
liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to
an agent to accept service of process has been given.’”229 In reversing the
trial court’s dismissal, and holding the defendant amenable to service of
process, the court concluded that “[i]t is undisputed that Cunard
voluntarily availed itself of the right to conduct commercial activities
within the State of Georgia on a continuing and systematic basis
through” the several business activities previously listed.230
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Cunard Line’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional–as determined by the
quantity and frequency of said forum activities. In this case, as the
Georgia Court of Appeals stated, the fact that Cunard Line was using
travel agencies within the state to conduct its business is not a shield—
224

198 S.E.2d 285 (Ga. 1973).
195 S.E.2d 399 (Ga. 1973).
226
Hollingsworth, 263 S.E.2d at 192-93.
227
Id. at 193.
228
The court held that
with the liberalization of due process criteria [McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957)], the jurisdictional distinction between agents and
independent contractors has begun to fade. Courts treat persons who derive
commission revenue [travel agencies], not in terms of agents or independent
contractors, but they view their activities and status in a realistic commercial
light.
Id. at 193 (quoting Mulhern v. Holland Am. Cruises, 393 F. Supp. 1298, 1302
(D.N.H. 1975)).”
229
Id. at 194 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
230
Id.
225
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the activities of an agent within the scope of the agency are clearly
chargeable to the principle under elementary agency law. Consequently,
there were numerous activities conducted in an ongoing frequency
through the travel agencies, as discussed previously—in other words, the
activities were continuous and systematic.
The second inquiry is whether or not the breach of contract and
fraud claims for the lack of the promised services and amenities arose
from Cunard Line’s forum activities. The Hollingsworths responded to
the advertising in Georgia, relied on brochures and promises by an agent
of the availability of certain services and amenities, and purchased the
tickets in Georgia.231 Thus, their cause of action arose from Cunard
Line’s continuous and systematic activities within Georgia. Accordingly,
this case falls within Quadrant I.
Regarding any “prejudice” to the defendant, under subsection
[3](C)(1) of the Model Long-Arm statute, in a Quadrant I case, it is
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, Georgia courts can exercise
personal jurisdiction over Cunard Lines under the Model Long-Arm
statute—without the doubt and indeterminacy present in the limitations
of a categorical long-arm statute.
While the outcome is the same, applying the Model Long-Arm in
this case gives a much “cleaner” analysis of why personal jurisdiction
should be upheld. The focus on all the operating facts together as part of
the litigation event sharpens the analysis, unlike the Georgia Court of
Appeals’ analysis which pays lip service to the Georgia long-arm statute
by quoting it (as though that is sufficient) and then employing a
somewhat unpersuasive federal due process analysis that mixes together
U.S. Supreme Court cases with a state court test which was created for
application of the Georgia long-arm statute.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
The need to effectuate the corrective justice principle is strong in
cases such as this where the corporate defendant is in complete control of
the services provided to its customers who have relied on its promised
services in their decision to purchase a ticket. The customers pay for the
trip up-front, thus creating a nonreciprocal risk – the cruise line is paid,
but the customers are at its mercy as to whether the promised services are
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provided.232 The state has a strong interest in protecting consumers
within its borders from suffering consumer fraud, especially where the
corporation is conducting ongoing business within the state. Thus, in this
case, the enterprise regulation principle clearly permits the state to act to
effectuate corrective justice – in other words, this case inhabits that core
domain where the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles
fully overlap.233
2. Griffin v. Air South, Inc.234
A wrongful death action against Air South and Beech Aircraft
Corp. arose out of an aircraft crash in Georgia.235 The aircraft was
operated by Air South and manufactured by Beech Aircraft.236 This
appeal involved Beech Aircraft’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.237 Beech Aircraft was a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas, but it sold the particular
type of aircraft in question directly to customers in Georgia, while selling
other aircraft through a distributor in Georgia.238
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
The court began with a due process analysis after stating that
Georgia’s long-arm statute had been held in a previous federal court
decision to be coterminous with due process limits.239 The court cited
several cases from other districts that had held that Beech’s distributor
agreements gave such control to Beech that it was doing business within
those states.240 Thus, the federal court held, Beech was also doing
business within Georgia through its distributor. As a result, there were
“sufficient contacts to satisfy the constitutional imperatives.”241
Although the court had already said that Georgia’s long-arm
reached due process limits, it then, curiously, stated that the long-arm
statue needed to be analyzed next. In doing so, the court analyzed the
232
For an explanation of how Professor Fletcher’s theory of nonreciprocal risk
exposure as a basis for tort liability informs personal jurisdiction analysis under the
“litigation-event” approach, see Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism, supra note 189,
at 447-49.
233
See Diagram 4, supra p. 395.
234
324 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
235
Id.
236
Id. at 1286.
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Id. at 1286-87.
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Id. at 1287-88.
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history of the statute and restated the proposition that the long-arm was
coterminous with due process limits.242 However, the court felt that it
was still necessary to apply the long-arm statute’s limiting language as it
went on to analyze subsections (2) and (3) and determined that
jurisdiction was valid under both of them.243 Personal jurisdiction was
valid under subsection (2), because, according to the court, its prior
decision which had held that the “Illinois Rule” applied to that
subsection was still valid—thus, Beech’s alleged negligence in
manufacturing the aircraft outside the state which caused injury in the
state was a sufficient basis upon which to predicate personal jurisdiction
under that subsection.244 Similarly, the court said, personal jurisdiction
was valid under subsection (3) because Beech was regularly doing
business in Georgia.245
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Beech Aircraft’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. The operative facts
were as follows: Beech sold the particular type aircraft directly to
customers in Georgia.246 In addition, it sold all its other type aircraft
through a distributor in Georgia.247 The distribution agreement Beech had
with its distributors gave it such control that Beech should be considered
to be doing business within the state. Therefore, Beech’s activities (its
aircraft marketing and sales through the distributor) were continuous and
systematic.
The second inquiry is whether or not the wrongful death claim for
the aircraft crash arose out of those forum activities. In this case, Beech
sold the particular aircraft to the airline in Georgia.248 Thus, the wrongful
death action arises out of Beech’s forum activity—the operative facts. As
a result, the case falls within Quadrant I.
Regarding “prejudice,” under subsection [3](C)(1) of the Model
Long-Arm, once it is determined that a case falls within Quadrant I, it is
conclusively presumed that the courts of the state have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Therefore, Georgia courts can exercise

242

Id. at 1288-89.
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personal jurisdiction over Beech Aircraft under the Model Long-Arm
statute.
Once again, although the result is the same, the analysis by the
federal district court was internally contradictory and analytically
dissonant—the court applied a due process analysis, but then, after
restating that Georgia’s long-arm was coterminous with due process, the
court parsed through the detailed interstices of the long-arm statute
anyway.249 The Model Statute, on the other hand, proceeds in a
systematic, consistent fashion to lead a court to determine that personal
jurisdiction was validly exercised. It is this cleaning up of analytic
dissonance in all varieties of litigation events presented in long-arm cases
that is a critical objective of the Model Long-Arm Statute. By removing
the dissonance, the analytic process becomes regularized and transparent,
which far better equips courts to take on the kind of “tough”
jurisdictional cases which, in the past, have either sent courts scrambling
for glosses or patches, or simply ignoring the legislated language of the
long-arm statute. Both phenomena produce dissonance and
indeterminacy, the elimination of which in all litigation events with an
extraterritorial element is a key objective of the Model Statute.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
As in the previous case, the need to effectuate the corrective justice
principle is strong in this case. The necessity of the production of safe
aircraft can not be overstated, given the pervasive use of aircraft for
travel in today’s society. A poorly designed, manufactured, or
maintained aircraft creates a nonreciprocal risk to those who fly and
travel on aircraft – the high probability of loss of life due to an aircraft
crash. Where, as here, a large number of such aircraft are sold within the
state, the state has a strong interest to provide redress in order to allow
effective enterprise regulation, as well as compensation for loss in
accordance with the corrective justice principle. Thus, as the regulatory
interest in Georgia is strong, this case falls in that core domain where the
corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles fully overlap.
B. Quadrant II—Single or Occasional Contact + Connected Cause of
Action
Subsection [3](B)(2) of the Model Long-Arm corresponds to
Quadrant II. Cases fall in this quadrant when the defendant’s single or
249

Id. at 1289-90.
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occasional forum activities give rise to the cause of action(s) on which
the plaintiff is suing. These are by far the most numerous types of cases
under Georgia’s long arm, a fact not surprising given the explicit “arising
from” requirement in the statute. Due to the categorical nature of the
long-arm, there are many cases for which personal jurisdiction is not
currently available under the Georgia long-arm where it would be
constitutional under due process to exercise personal jurisdiction within
specific jurisdiction.
1. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, Inc. v. Ruotolo Associates,
Inc.250
This case involved a breach of contract, theft of proprietary
information, and misrepresentation suit against Ruotolo, a New Jersey
corporation with no offices in Georgia.251 The parties had agreed to work
together to provide stewardship campaigns for various parishes and
dioceses throughout the country.252 While Catholic Stewardship
Consultants (CSC) worked on proposals for other dioceses in its Georgia
office, Ruotolo requested that CSC prepare a stewardship proposal for
the Diocese of Camden in New Jersey, which CSC agreed to do and
worked on at its Georgia office.253 Subsequently, Ruotolo secured a
contract with the New Jersey diocese to the exclusion of the CSC.254
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
After citing the long-arm statute, the Georgia Court of Appeals
stated that the long-arm “confers jurisdiction over nonresidents to the
maximum extent permitted by due process.”255 Despite this
pronouncement, the Court of Appeals proceeded to apply Georgia’s
long-arm statute and its corresponding less-than-due-process-limits
restrictions on contacts. The Court of Appeals first analyzed whether
Ruotolo transacted any business under subsection (1) of the long-arm
statute and found personal jurisdiction lacking under that subsection,
because no negotiations for the projects, including the one for New
Jersey, were held in Georgia, and Ruotolo took no actions in Georgia that
were related to the projects with the CSC.256 Ruotolo’s telephone and email communications directed at the plaintiff regarding the projects were
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
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not sufficient activities under the Georgia courts’ prior interpretations.257
Next, the Court of Appeals analyzed the theft of proprietary information
and misrepresentation claims under subsection (3), holding that because
“Ruotolo Associates did not engage in a persistent course of conduct in
Georgia or derive substantial revenues from goods used or services
rendered in Georgia,” personal jurisdiction was unavailable under that
subsection as well.258 Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Ruotolo’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. While the agreement
was not negotiated or consummated in Georgia, Ruotolo did direct
communications at CSC by telephone and e-mail concerning the projects
that CSC was preparing, as stated previously. Although Georgia courts
hold these activities to be insufficient contacts, the United States
Supreme Court has held they are sufficient, at least where they are
purposefully directed toward a party in another state.259 Thus, these
communications directed to CSC count as contacts under due process
limits. Ruotolo had other isolated activities in Georgia which were not
related to its agreement with CSC.260 Thus the communications, as the
only legitimate contacts, can be classified as “occasional,” because they
do not, standing alone, amount to “systematic or continuous” activities in
the forum.
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of actions arose
from Ruotolo’s forum activities. The breach of contract and theft of
proprietary information occurred based on Ruotolo’s request for CSC’s
work on the New Jersey diocese project, which CSC accomplished and
sent to Ruotolo, and which Ruotolo then used to obtain a contract only
for itself. Ruotolo contacted CSC using the telephone and e-mail about
the stewardship projects as they were prepared by CSC in Georgia.261
Therefore the cause of action arose from Ruotolo’s telephone and e-mail
contacts with CSC. Consequently, the case falls within Quadrant II.

257

Id.
Id. at 6.
See supra note 85.
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These activities were attending a trade show and performing a fundraising project
for a Georgia school. Catholic Stewardship Consultants, 608 S.E.2d at 2-3.
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Under subsection [3](C)(2) of the Model Long-Arm, in a Quadrant
II case the defendant is presumed to be amenable to personal jurisdiction
and may rebut the presumption through admissible evidence that clearly
and convincingly establishes prejudice (as defined in subsection [2](A)).
It is unlikely that any of the four factors there would apply in this case.
First, Ruotolo would not be deprived of access to evidence. Second, the
cost of litigating in Georgia is not likely significantly disproportionate to
Ruotolo’s resources. Third, as discussed next, in subsection c, infra, the
state has a legitimate regulatory interest; and fourth, there is no
applicable treaty. Thus, personal jurisdiction would be upheld under the
Model Long-Arm statute in this case.
This result illustrates the differing outcomes that occur due to the
problems of making the critical characterization of a non-forum
defendant’s contacts that have arisen under the régime of the categorical
long-arm statute by the Georgia state courts. E-mail, phone calls, and
facsimile contacts by a defendant were not sufficient contacts with the
forum under Georgia’s long-arm statute, according to those rulings. But,
as recognized under the Model Long-Arm statute, these contacts are of
sufficient quality where the cause of action arises out of them. Further,
these contacts should place the burden of challenging personal
jurisdiction on the defendant, rather than place the burden on the plaintiff
to meet the indeterminate and ad hoc pronouncements that have been
given in wrestling with the unilluminating provisions of the current
statute, which do not focus the courts on the most relevant
considerations.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
In this case, the corrective justice principle is applicable in
remedying a pecuniary injury experienced by a resident corporation from
a nonresident corporation. Where one corporation seeks to take unfair
advantage of another, the corporation taken advantage of needs a remedy
through which it may obtain justice at home. Now that a substantial
amount of business is done via the Internet and electronic
communications, a state needs to be better equipped to protect residents
doing business with distant parties. The enterprise regulation principle is
applicable in the general sense that a state needs to effectuate corrective
justice in order to discourage nonresident corporations from attempting
to take unfair advantage of resident corporations, and to foster a better
business climate – especially for smaller corporations, where it is
important to limit the expenses that would otherwise occur from having
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to litigate a claim in a distant forum. The foregoing reasons, along with
the quality of the contacts (e-mail and telephone discussion from which
the claim arises from) push this case from the limb-dweller status into the
overlapping portion of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principles.262
2. Worthy v. Eller263
This case involved a defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress action264 by a husband against an Alabama attorney
representing his wife in an Alabama divorce action.265 When the wife did
not want her husband to pick up their three-year-old child from a day
care center located just across the border in Columbus, Georgia, her
attorney contacted the center which stated it would need a court order to
deny the husband from picking up the child.266 The attorney faxed a fake
court order to the center from Alabama and the center then called the
police, who prevented the husband from seeing the child.267
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and ordered the case
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court held that
subsection (2) barred personal jurisdiction over the defamation claim.268
The court then held that the defendant, who practiced in Alabama only,
did not have the required contacts under subsection (3) for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim, stating that telephone and facsimile
were not sufficient contacts.269 The court did not analyze whether that
claim would allow for jurisdiction under subsection (2), presumably
because it did not consider the tortious act to have occurred in the state.
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Worthy’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. As discussed
previously, Worthy telephoned and sent a facsimile to the center located
262

See Diagram 4, supra p. 395.
594 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
264
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in Georgia. These were single or occasional contacts directed at Georgia
by the nonresident defendant.
The second inquiry is whether or not the defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims arise out of Worthy’s forum
activities. The telephone conversation with the center’s representatives
and the facsimile sent to the center were the activities which gave rise to
Eller’s claims. These facts fall easily within the litigation event as
described in subsections (2)(B) and (2)(E) of the Model Long-Arm.
Therefore, the cause of actions arose from Worthy’s forum activities and
the case falls within Quadrant II.
Under subsection (3)(C)(2) of the Model Long-Arm, in a Quadrant
II case the defendant is presumed to be amenable to personal jurisdiction
and may rebut the presumption through admissible evidence that clearly
and convincingly establishes “prejudice” (as defined in subsection
(2)(A)). It is unlikely that any of the four factors there would apply in
this case. First, the defendant would not be deprived of access to
evidence by litigating the suit in Georgia; second, the cost of the suit
over the border in nearby Columbus would not be disproportionate to the
Alabama attorney’s financial resources; third, Georgia has a legitimate
interest in preventing false court orders from being sent into the state,
causing severe emotional distress to forum-state residents, and tying up
police resources; and fourth, there is not a treaty that applies in this
situation. Therefore, Worthy would be amenable to personal jurisdiction
in Georgia.
The difference in result under the Model Long-Arm statute is due to
the Georgia long-arm statute’s out-of-date defamation exception. Also
Georgia’s long-arm statute lacks reach under subsection (2) when the
tortious act is committed outside the state. These shortcomings,
combined with the problems of properly characterizing the quality of
telephone and facsimile contacts by Georgia courts, as described in the
discussion of Catholic Stewardship Consultants v. Ruotolo Associates
contribute to the resulting differences.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
Although no corporation is involved here, Eller’s claim involves a
harm that occurred within Georgia as a result of the nonresident
attorney’s action. A state certainly has an interest in regulating
nonresidents conducting legal service-related business within the state,
whether it is an individual attorney or a large law firm, and effectuating
the corrective justice principle when such professionals engage in
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(mis)conduct that damages the interests of Georgia residents. As such,
this case comes within the area where the corrective justice and
enterprise regulation principles overlap.
C. Quadrant III—Continuous and Systematic Contacts, but Unconnected
Cause of Action
Quadrant III, which is equivalent to general jurisdiction, is
represented by subsection (3)(B)(3) of the Model Long-Arm statute.
Causes of action fall into this quadrant where the nonresident defendant
has continuous and systematic activities within the state such that
personal jurisdiction may be upheld in a cause of action unrelated to
those activities. This is generally the case if the defendant is a
corporation with a principal residence, a functional headquarters, or a
branch office in the forum, or one which is “doing business” in the forum
such that the state has an interest in regulating its rights and duties (under
the enterprise regulation principle). There are no cases decided by
Georgia state courts that have upheld personal jurisdiction under the
long-arm statute within Quadrant III criteria due to the “arising from”
requirement of Georgia’s long-arm statute.270
Yet, Georgia does allow what amounts to Quadrant III general
jurisdiction through the Georgia Business Corporation Act271 and the
definition of nonresident in its long-arm statute.272 As a result, “a
plaintiff wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation authorized to do
business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal jurisdiction
parameters of § 9-10-91, including the requirement that a cause of action
arise out of a defendant’s activities within the state.”273 The effect of this
holding is that once it is deemed that a corporation is authorized to do
business in Georgia, it is then essentially subject to Quadrant III general
personal jurisdiction–not, however, through the long-arm statute.274
270

However, the Eleventh Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction in a general jurisdiction
or Quadrant III case, based on its position that Georgia’s statute is coterminous with the
limits of due process. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
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See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1501 (2006) (concerning when authority to transact
business is required).
272
As discussed in note 19, supra.
273
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ga. 1992). This case is discussed
infra as one of the Quadrant III cases.
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One court explained:
The corporations over which Georgia might exercise jurisdiction fall into
three categories: (1) domestic corporations, i.e., corporations organized and
existing under the laws of Georgia; (2) resident foreign corporations, i.e.,
corporations organized and existing under the laws of another state but
authorized to do business in Georgia ([GA. CODE ANN.] § 14-2-1501); and
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Some might argue that since there are these vicarious means
through which Georgia courts may effectively exercise general
jurisdiction, there is no “problem” to be remedied here by a Model
Statute. That is an instrumentalist perspective, however, that ignores the
problems raised by the current régime. First, to rely on a patchwork of
laws, external to the long-arm statute itself, to create a substitute for
general personal jurisdiction invites considerable indeterminacy and
ensures analytic dissonance. Second, it leaves discord between the state
courts and the federal courts sitting in their diversity jurisdiction, for the
federal courts have entertained full general personal jurisdiction under
Georgia’s long-arm statute, even where the patchwork of external
statutes might not cover a particular nonresident defendant. This second
problem leads directly to the third, and perhaps most significant problem
with continued reliance on the current régime for a synthetic general
jurisdiction–there are holes, such as those illustrated by the Georgia
court’s adherence to the “arising under” preamble of the long-arm
contrasted with the federal court’s flat assertion of the availability of
general personal jurisdiction, where a nonresident defendant may escape
personal jurisdiction on a “non-arising-out-of” cause of action when it is
not technically registered “to do” or “transact” business in Georgia. The
Model Long-Arm statute would ameliorate the three problems with the
current approach to general jurisdiction by allowing Quadrant III general
jurisdiction. This also would eliminate the potential due process
violations that may occur from failing to conduct a minimum contacts
analysis.275 Two cases in which the exercise of personal jurisdiction was
thwarted by the particular structure of the categorical long-arm statute
are evaluated below.
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Klein276
This case involved an action by the insured against insurer to obtain
insurance benefits allegedly due insured for automobile accident.277
Klein, a nonresident of Georgia, was traveling through Georgia as a
(3) nonresident foreign corporations, i.e., corporations organized and
existing under the laws of another state and not authorized to do or transact
business in this state ([GA. CODE ANN.] § 9-10-90). General jurisdiction can
be exercised over domestic corporations and resident foreign corporations.
However, jurisdiction is limited by the Long Arm Statute when dealing with
nonresident foreign corporations.
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders, 460 S.E.2d 94, 95 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (en
banc) (internal citations omitted).
275
See supra note 19.
276
422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992).
277
Id. at 864.
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passenger in his father’s car when he was injured in an automobile
accident.278 The car was insured by Allstate under a New Jersey
policy.279 When Allstate did not pay benefits that Klein alleged were due
under Georgia’s no-fault statute, he sued Allstate in Georgia.280
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
Klein did not employ the long-arm statute as a basis for personal
jurisdiction. He instead argued that because Allstate is authorized to
transact business in Georgia, and has an office and registered agent in the
county where suit was brought, it is not a “nonresident” as that term is
defined in the long-arm statute.281 Allstate, while admitting it was
authorized to transact business in Georgia, argued that subsection (1) of
the long-arm statute still applied, and that because “the contract was not
entered into in Georgia and . . . there were no contacts within Georgia
between Klein and Allstate with respect to the contract,” it was not
amenable to personal jurisdiction.282 The trial court agreed and granted
Allstate’s motion to dismiss.283 The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
applying the long-arm statute and holding “that because ‘the claim in this
case adequately results from or is linked to Allstate’s broad-based forumrelated insurance activities,’ the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a
Georgia court over Allstate is justified.”284 The Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed the reversal, but on the grounds that Klein had originally
argued–that because Allstate was authorized to transact business in
Georgia, it was considered a “resident” for purposes of service of
process.285 Yet, in so ruling, the court did not give much consideration to
whether that registration is really sufficient to satisfy due process
requirements. The United States Supreme Court has held that all
extraterritorial exercises of personal jurisdiction are subject to the
International Shoe analysis.286 The United States Supreme Court has
condemned using, e.g., stock registration or “situs-ing” rules as a legal
fiction to stand in the place, virtually, of a nonresident defendant having
constitutionally meaningful contacts with a forum.287 The Court has not
accepted a case since Shaffer to reconsider whether other legal fictions—
278
279
280
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like a requirement of registration to merely transact business—supplies a
constitutionally sufficient nexus upon which to predicate personal
jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court last examined such a law—which is based
on questionable notions of fictionalized, implied consent under the
Pennoyer v. Neff régime–in an opinion by Justice Butler in 1927.288
Eighty years, and a revolution in the views of personal jurisdiction, may
well have entirely eroded such relics, which continue to stand primarily
because no one has pushed hard enough to topple them.
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Allstate’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. As a nationwide
insurance corporation, Allstate has several offices in the state of Georgia
and does substantial business in the state. Thus, its forum activities in
Georgia are continuous and systematic.
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of action arose from
Allstate’s forum activities. In this case, the insurance policy on the car
was made in New Jersey. Thus, the action to obtain personal injury
benefits was not related to Allstate’s activities in Georgia, since the
policy upon which the claim was based was made in New Jersey.
Accordingly, under subsection (3)(B)(3) of the Model Long-Arm statute,
a further inquiry is necessary to determine if the defendant’s contacts are
so substantial and of such a nature to justify an action based on a cause
of action not arising from its activities in Georgia. Allstate has a branch
office in the county where suit was brought. Under subsection
(3)B)(3)(i), having a branch office in the state may, or may not, be
sufficient to exercise general personal jurisdiction in a Quadrant III
situation. The constitutionally proper inquiry in such a case, then, will
focus on the quality and quantity of the nonresident defendant’s forum
activities,289 rather than upon glib notions of fictionalized consent under
business regulation statutes.
Regarding “prejudice,” under subsection (3)(C)(3)(a), the
presumption that the defendant is prejudiced by maintenance of the
action can be rebutted by the plaintiff if he establishes that the defendant
has a branch office in the forum. Because Allstate has a branch office in
Georgia, and in the county where suit was brought, the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Allstate would appear constitutionally
permitted, but Allstate would have an opportunity to rebut this
288
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in detail a Philippine corporation’s activities while in exile in Ohio during Japanese
occupation of Philippines during World War II).
289

422

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:339

presumption factually, which it is not accorded under the “transacting
business” registration statute approach.
While the application of the Model Long-Arm statute arrives at the
same result, it does so by a minimum contacts analysis, rather than
relying on the fiction of a non-jurisdictional registration statute. By
analyzing facts relevant to the litigation event, rather than shortcircuiting relevant analysis with what amounts to an unrebuttable
presumption that personal jurisdiction exists, the Model Statute avoids
potential due process violations, as previously discussed, when a
minimum contacts analysis is not accomplished.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
Sometimes the corrective justice principle and enterprise regulation
principle do not overlap into a common domain to justify jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant. Even when they do, the analysis
undertaken by the court should be supported by the analytic framework
of International Shoe. The Allstate court’s analysis skips this critical
step, by resorting to an early twentieth century Pennoyer-era legal
fiction. It may well be that the litigation event does fall at the parallax of
the relevant working principles: insureds who have paid premiums to
their insurer are faced with a nonreciprocal risk of the insurer not paying
a claim as required, and as suggested by the highly regulated nature of
the insurance business, a state has a strong reason to regulate insurers
conducting business within it in order to effectuate corrective justice.
Hence, in this case, Georgia may have a strong interest in adjudicating an
alleged wrongful denial of a claim by an insurer within its borders.
However, a relevant inquiry, under the rule of general personal
jurisdiction articulated in the Model Statute, needs to be undertaken
before general jurisdiction will yield transparent and coherent results.
2. Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders290
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. (“PWC”) manufactured the engine
that was used by a commuter aircraft which crashed in Kentucky.291
Representatives of a passenger who was killed brought a products
liability action against PWC in Georgia.292
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292
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a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
The basis for the trial court’s denial of PWC’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is not discussed. In finding a lack of
personal jurisdiction and reversing, the Georgia Court of Appeals first
analyzed whether PWC was a “resident” foreign corporation according
to the definition of “non-resident” in the long-arm statute. It held that
PWC was not a “resident,” because “PWC is not authorized to do or
transact business in Georgia, does not have any offices or employees in
Georgia, and does not have a registered agent for service of process in
Georgia.”293 Thus, because PWC was a nonresident, the Court of
Appeals analyzed whether the long-arm statute allowed for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. Since the aircraft crash occurred outside
Georgia, the cause of action did not arise from the defendant’s activities
within Georgia as required by the long-arm statute. Thus, “Georgia has
no basis to assert jurisdiction over PWC, a nonresident foreign
corporation, because the cause of action did not occur in Georgia, and no
other basis exists therefor.”294 The dissent argued, however, that general
personal jurisdiction was available over the defendant.295
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether PWC’s activities within Georgia were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. PWC had not
registered for authorization to transact business in Georgia, but it did
business with at least two customers there, including three to four million
dollars of business a year with one of those customers.296 Also, an
affiliated company, P&WC Aircraft Services, Inc., operated a service
station in Atlanta, Georgia, to which PWC shipped spare parts.297
Additionally, PWC sent employees to the state for customer relations and
marketing.298 These activities were more than merely occasional, but
were ongoing, and continuous and systematic activities by PWC with the
forum.
The second inquiry is whether or not the cause of action arose from
PWC’s forum activities. In this case, PWC manufactured its engines in
Canada and the aircraft crash occurred in Kentucky. Therefore, the
293

Id. at 96.
Id. at 97.
“It is my view that PWC is subject to a general jurisdiction in the courts of Georgia
due to its continuous and systematic commercial activities in Georgia.” Id. at 98
(McMurray, P. J., dissenting).
296
Id. at 99.
297
Id.
298
Id.
294
295
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products liability action did not arise from PWC’s activities within
Georgia, and the case must be further analyzed under subsection
(3)(B)(3). Under subsection (3)(B)(3)(ii), it must then be determined
whether the continuous and systematic contacts are of such quantity as to
support the conclusion that PWC is present in the forum. The numerous,
ongoing contacts described above are such that, at least arguably, PWC
should be considered present in Georgia. Therefore, the case appears to
satisfy the minimum contact requirement of Quadrant III.
Under subsection (3)(C)(3), in a Quadrant III case, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the defendant is prejudiced by maintenance
of the action within the forum. This presumption can be rebutted,
however, under subsection (3)(C)(3)(b), if the plaintiff establishes that
the defendant’s contacts with the forum demonstrate that the defendant
has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of “doing
business” in the forum as to support the conclusion that it is present in
the forum. This places an appropriate burden on the plaintiffs seeking to
invoke general personal jurisdiction to compile a competently detailed
and factually adequate record of the nonresident defendant’s forum
activities. In this case, the numerous continuous and systematic contacts
discussed above appear to be the kind of information required for a court
to support the notion that PWC is “doing business” within Georgia. The
proper analysis, therefore, focuses on a qualitative assessment of PWC’s
in-state activities, which is the only defensible way to evaluate whether
PWC would be prejudiced by maintenance of the action within Georgia,
and personal jurisdiction would be validly exercised over the
corporation.
The difference in outcome under the Model Long-Arm statute
illustrates how it properly characterizes the quantity of contacts as
continuous and systematic, unlike the Georgia courts, which, due to the
constraints of the Georgia long-arm statute, do not recognize the
significance of the quantity of contacts when the cause of action does not
arise out of them.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
The need for corrective justice in this type of case is strong. The
manufacturer of an aircraft engine clearly creates a nonreciprocal risk to
those traveling in an aircraft—the risk of death or serious injury due to
an engine failure. Although the allegedly defective part was
manufactured in Canada and the aircraft crash that the cause of action is
based upon did not occur in Georgia, the state has an interest in
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regulating PWC and effectuating the corrective justice principle because
of the extent of business that PWC does within Georgia and the presence
of its products in the air over the state. Admittedly, this is not a
circumstance where the cause of action lies within the heart of the
overlap between the corrective justice and enterprise regulation
principles because the alleged tortious act and injury occurred outside the
state, but the importance of ensuring that PWC’s products shipped into
Georgia are safe helps to push this case from the limb into the area of
overlap.
D. Quadrant 4—Single or Occasional Contact + Unconnected Cause of
Action

Quadrant IV corresponds to subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model
Long-Arm statute. The cause of action falls within the domain of
the corrective justice principle, but outside the enterprise
regulation principle of the state. The plaintiff has suffered a wrong,
but the forum state can not properly adjudicate or remedy the
wrong. Personal jurisdiction is also lacking under the Georgia
long-arm statute in such situations, because the cause of action is
not related to any forum activity and additionally, in some cases,
the defendant’s forum activities do not fit within the statute’s
enumerated categories.
1. Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc.299
Barton Southern Co., Inc., a Georgia company that sells manhole
security devices, brought a trademark infringement action against
Manhole Barrier Systems, Inc. (“MBS”), a New York company that also
sells the devices, and against JFC Company. MBS, which had no
customers in Georgia and had not solicited orders from Georgia,
contacted Barton Southern requesting information about its products and
ordered one of its devices.300 A few months later, after two more phone
calls requesting price information, MBS ordered several more devices,
and on another occasion contacted Barton Southern about distributing its
devices in South America.301 In the meantime, JFC Company established
a website whose name allegedly infringed Barton Southern’s registered
trademark for its security devices and which had a link to MBS’s website
that advertised its manhole protection devices.302 Barton Southern
299
300
301
302

318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1175-76.
Id. at 1176.

426

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:339

brought the trademark infringement action against both companies,
alleging they were working together to capitalize on its trademark.303

a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
The court began its analysis by quoting a portion of the Georgia
long-arm statute.304 However, the court then stated that “[t]he statute
confers jurisdiction to the ‘maximum extent permitted by due
process.’”305 Consequently, the court proceeded with a due process
analysis.306 Yet, in doing so, the court stated a “fair warning” test for due
process, listing several factors that had been given in a Georgia Court of
Appeals case in order to determine whether there were minimum
contacts.307 After listing these factors, the court then proceeded to
analyze MBS’s website contact and its telephone/purchase order contacts
separately, finding that the website contact failed under the “purposeful
availment” factor and that the telephone/purchase order contacts failed
under the “claims-must-relate-to-the-act” factor, as discussed next. The
court, using the Zippo test,308 determined that MBS’s website was a semi303

Id.
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
The factors to determine “fair warning” are “whether the nonresident’s conduct
and connection with the forum state are such that the nonresident should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there, whether the nonresident acted to avail itself of the
forum state’s law, whether the claim relates to those acts, and whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable.” Barton S. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1176 (citing SES Indus.,
Inc. v. Intertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 316, 319 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)).
308
The Zippo test derived from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 952 F. Supp. 1119
(W.D. Pa.1997), which introduced the “influential ‘sliding scale’ model for applying
personal jurisdiction principles to cases arising from electronic commerce.” Barton S.
Co., 318 F. Supp.2d at 1177. The court found that
[i]n holding that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper in the
plaintiff’s home state, the Zippo court distinguished among interactive,
semi-interactive, and passive websites:
. . . At one end of the spectrum are situations where a
defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the
defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission
of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant
has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is
accessible to users of foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site
that does little more than make information available to those
who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by
interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
304
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interactive website because customers could only fill out an order form
and could not make payments or complete the order through the
website.309
Additionally, the MBS website had never received any e-mail from
anyone in Georgia, nor had MBS sent any e-mail via its website to
anyone in Georgia. Thus, the court concluded “that the MBS website
fails to furnish a Georgia contact adequate to support personal
jurisdiction over MBS in the Georgia courts.” 310 Regarding the telephone
and the purchase order contacts, the court determined that the trademark
infringement action was not related to those activities, and then stated
that the trademark infringement claim did not directly arise from these
limited commercial contacts.311 Therefore, personal jurisdiction over
MBS was lacking.
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether MBS’s forum activities (website,
telephone and purchase orders) were continuous and systematic, or single
or occasional. The website was not even a forum activity due to the fact
that no one in Georgia had placed orders on the site and MBS had not
received e-mail from or sent e-mail to anyone in Georgia through the
site. The telephone and purchase order activities by MBS directed toward
Barton Southern were single or occasional, because they were made on
an infrequent basis and were not ongoing.
The second inquiry is whether or not the trademark infringement
action arose out of MBS’s forum activities. The website is not a forum
activity, as discussed previously. The other activities describe a
relationship between the defendant and the forum, but the trademark
infringement claim did not arise out of the telephone conversations,
which concerned the potential of MBS becoming a distributor of Barton
Southern’s products, and the claim did not arise out of the purchase of
Barton Southern products. Consequently, because there are no forum
activities out of which the cause of action arises, the suit falls within
Quadrant IV and, under subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model Long-Arm,
the absence of personal jurisdiction is established as a matter of law.
Although the result is the same, the differences in application are
worth noting. The federal district court’s analysis first cites the Georgia
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site.
Barton S. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (citing Zippo Mfg., 952 F. Supp. at 1124).
309
Id. at 1177-78.
310
Barton S. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d. at 1177.
311
Id. at 1178.
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Long-Arm statute, as though it will apply it, but then goes on to say that
it reaches to due process limits. The court then states a federal due
process “fairness test,” which it derives from a Georgia state court case.
Then, for the telephone and purchase contacts, the court first states that
the claim is not related to and then that the claim does not directly arise
from these contacts. This mixture of terminology shows a lack of
appreciation of the difference between the two phrases. For if a claim is
not related to a contact, then it is a given that it does not directly arise
from that same contact. The Model Long-Arm Statute’s application gives
a much more logical and structured analysis of the question of personal
jurisdiction, and strictly uses an “arising out of” criteria, as the looser
“related to” criteria has not been adopted by a United States Supreme
Court majority.312
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
In this case, Barton Southern has allegedly suffered a wrong that
requires a remedy. There is a nonreciprocal risk involved where one
company’s trademark is infringed–it risks losing goodwill for its product
as well as a loss in sales, while the infringer gains from additional sales–
but the level of non-reciprocity is minimal since the victim may engage
(albeit not lawfully) in similar anti-competitive activity, may appeal
directly to consumers to counteract the effects of infringement, and may
stop the infringement altogether by the injunctive remedy afforded under
both state and federal trademark protection laws. Further, in this case, the
lack of substantial contacts with the forum does not justify Georgia in
regulating MBS. Its website was not connected with Georgia and the
trademark infringement claim did not arise out of the telephone and
orders, which were also not sufficiently pervasive to justify the ultimate
in regulation – treating a non-resident as a virtual resident under the
compulsion of process predicated upon general personal jurisdiction.
Thus, the operative facts of this case implicate only the corrective justice
principle within the Georgia forum, falling outside the intersection with
the enterprise regulation principle that would allow for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.

312
Compare Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416
(1981) (majority opinion) with Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 419-20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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2. Gee v. Reingold313
This case involved a breach of contract, negligence, and breach of
fiduciary duty action by a client against his nonresident attorney. After
Gee received a complaint, delivered by Federal Express from a
Wisconsin company that was suing him in Wisconsin, Gee contacted
Reingold, a Tennessee attorney, who advised him that the service was
insufficient under Georgia law.314 When Gee was served by a sheriff’s
deputy about two weeks later, Reingold contacted the corporation’s
attorney to request an extension of time to answer the complaint.
Subsequently, “Gee called Reingold’s office several times and left
messages, and Gee went to Reingold’s office ‘two or three times,’ but
Reingold never responded to the messages or saw Gee. No answer was
filed in the Wisconsin action, and a default judgment was entered against
Gee . . . for $356,800.”315 When the corporation filed suit in Georgia to
domesticate the judgment against Gee, he filed suit against Reingold.
The trial court dismissed the complaint against Reingold due to lack of
personal jurisdiction.316
a. Georgia Long-Arm Application
In affirming the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, the
Georgia Court of Appeals discussed subsections (1), (2), and (3) of the
long-arm statute. First, the Court of Appeals determined that Reingold
had not transacted business in Georgia in relation to the Wisconsin suit.
“[T]he telephone conversations between Reingold and Gee, facsimile
transmissions by Gee from Georgia to Tennessee, and Reingold’s
mailing of bills to Gee in Georgia do not show that Reingold transacted
business in Georgia within the meaning of the statute. Reingold’s
services were performed in Tennessee and pertained to non-Georgia
matters.”317 Also, “there [was] no evidence that Gee and Reingold
negotiated any contracts in Georgia.”318 Thus, the court reasoned,
Reingold was not amenable to personal jurisdiction under subsection (1).
The court also determined that Reingold did not commit a tortious act
within Georgia as required by subsection (2), because the alleged tortious
act (or omission) occurred with respect to the default judgment in
Wisconsin.319 Under subsection (3), the Court found that Reingold’s
313
314
315
316
317
318
319

578 S.E.2d 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id. at 579.
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activities in Georgia were not sufficient to meet the requirements of that
subsection.320 Consequently, the court declined to permit the state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over Reingold.321
b. Model Long-Arm Application
The first inquiry is whether Reingold’s forum activities were
continuous and systematic, or single or occasional. Reingold, who had
been practicing for 40 years, had handled no more than ten cases in
Georgia.322 Reingold had sent bills to Gee, as stated previously. These
forum activities were only isolated. The telephone calls and facsimiles
were initiated by Gee from Georgia, and thus were arguably not forum
activities by Reingold. Also Reingold’s representation of Gee in an
unrelated case involving a Tennessee employee of Gee’s was not a forum
activity .323 Consequently, Reingold participated in only occasional or
isolated forum activities.
The second inquiry is whether or not the breach of contract,
negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty claims arose out of Reingold’s
forum activities. His only forum activities were the handling of a few
cases in Georgia courts and the mailing of bills to Gee. The claims arose
out of a default judgment that occurred in Wisconsin. The claims were in
no way related to Reingold’s handling of the other Georgia cases, and
did not arise out of his sending of bills to Gee. Therefore, because there
are no forum activities out of which the cause of action arises, the suit
falls within Quadrant IV and, under subsection (3)(B)(4) of the Model
Long-Arm, the absence of personal jurisdiction is established as a matter
of law.
While the result is the same, the Model Long-Arm, by focusing on
the characterization of the quality of the contacts, presents the rationale
for the lack of minimum contacts in a more structured and principled
manner.
c. How Applying the Model Long-Arm Statute Recognizes the
Intersecting Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise
Regulation Principles
In this case, Gee has suffered an alleged injury that requires a
remedy. However, because the operative facts showed little relation
between Reingold and the forum, Georgia’s regulatory interest was weak
320
321
322
323
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Id.
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Id. at 578.

2007] Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the 21st Century

431

where the cause of action did not arise out of the few relations it had with
the defendant. Thus, once again, the operative facts fall within the
corrective justice domain, but outside the enterprise regulation domain of
Georgia, making it improper for personal jurisdiction to be exercised
over the defendant in Georgia.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Authors’ Map of the Territory Traversed
We have shown in this article how the categorical long-arm
statutes, with their inherent limitations, do not accord with the states’
desire to enable the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limits of the
due process clause as set by International Shoe. The resulting
inconsistencies in interpretation as cases arose which revealed the
unnecessary restrictions of the categorical approach, were highlighted by
a case study of Georgia’s categorical long-arm statute. The need for a
new approach was thus made clear. However, instead of simply
proposing that states adopt an unguided limits-of-due-process approach,
we, through a visual reconceptualization of personal jurisdiction, exposit
a method that allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction to reach the
limits of due process with principled guidance based on the corrective
justice
and
enterprise
regulation
principles.
This
visual
reconceptualization was the basis for our proposed Model Long-Arm
statute. That statute is logically and intellectually true to a regime of
personal jurisdiction inaugurated by International Shoe that is
consistently and completely laid out in the case, but whose existence is
often overlooked by those who measure International Shoe by how other
judges have employed it, rather than by the context and logic of the
opinion itself. Finally, the application of the Model Long-Arm statute
was compared to the application of Georgia’s categorical long-arm
statute to illustrate how the Model Long-Arm is to be applied and how it
would provide better and more predictable and principled results.
B. A Coda for the Reader
A decade ago, at its fiftieth anniversary, International Shoe was the
subject of intensive scholarly scrutiny, generating a dozen articles, most
of which denounced International Shoe as standardless, and sought to
replace it with a variety of approaches, including a venue-style
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analysis.324 What is rather amazing is that few of these experts appeared
to have spent much time reading and evaluating International Shoe itself.
Rather like a glossator who glosses upon the glosses of others, scholars
have spilled much laser-printer ink complaining about the shortcomings
of how subsequent courts have decided cases after International Shoe.325
They have not devoted much, if any, time to encountering the text of the
1945 opinion on its own terms and logic and, by critical reading,
revealing the powerful internal logic of the approach. Not a single of
these authors did so; not a single one recognized that the problem with
subsequent cases was their failure to recognize the internal logic for the
paradigm personal jurisdiction cases that, in this article, the authors have
made transparent through identifying often-overlooked normative rules
statements within International Shoe as well as visual conceputalizations
of the operation of those rules.
In recent years, Professor George Rutherglen has made one of the
more aggressive assaults on International Shoe, declaring that the case
“is one of the enduring monuments of Legal Realism and this is, we are
told, a ‘negative philosophy fit to do negative work.’”326 And true to his
charge that International Shoe is bete noir, the unwelcome offspring of
legal realism, Professor Rutherglen declares that “it is difficult . . . to find
a more effective and more thorough job of ‘trashing’ legal rules than has
been accomplished by International Shoe.”327 He accuses the opinion of
being written “at a very high level of abstraction,” of constituting no
more than “realist criticism . . . disguised as a magisterial summary of
existing law,” and, in his view, of amounting to a failure: “[I]n writing an
opinion that tried to satisfy everyone, [Chief Justice] Stone offered
guidance to no one.”328
Yet, as Professor Youngblood first perceived in 1985, and as the
authors have fully developed here and in earlier articles, International
Shoe is a kind of Rosetta Stone that rewards those who study its text
holistically. In fact, these efforts, the authors believe, fully meet
Rutherglen’s concerns that “it should be possible to state more
324
See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreward: Fifty Years Of International Shoe: The
Past And Future Of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513, 513-29 (1995)
(summarizing the work of each of the twelve contributors to the symposium).
325
See, e.g., id.; George Rutherglen, International Shoe And The Legacy Of Legal
Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 358 (2001) (relying on “the reception and
consequences of International Shoe” to “bear out” the thesis that International Shoe
“offer[s] guidance to no one”).
326
Id. at 349 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Dissent On Douglas, NEW YORK REVIEW OF
BOOKS, at 6 (Feb. 19, 1981)).
327
Id. at 349.
328
Id. at 358.
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specifically” the rules that create a general consistency among
jurisdictional outcomes and that such an “effort . . . would be entirely
consistent with the structure and ambitions of International Shoe
itself.”329 Indeed, the authors here have used the text of International
Shoe itself to go beyond the discernment of the rules by Youngblood in
1985 to meet Rutherglen’s call for devising “presumptive rules,”330
which the authors have done using the imperative implications that flow
from the four scenarios of contacts and connectedness to cause of action
envisioned in International Shoe itself.
Grudgingly, it seems, Professor Rutherglen also observes that
International Shoe “was a fine first step in the reexamination of
jurisdictional theories, but it was never intended to be the last step.” With
this, the authors agree in part. The solution that the authors see is not to
resort, as some have done, to casting the eye wistfully abroad, wishing
upon our legal system a European-style solution to a uniquely American
jurisdictional problem.331 Rather, the solution is in reforming long-arm
statutes themselves. The pedigree of such statutes along the early efforts
of the Illinois model lies separate and apart from International Shoe’s
internal logic. Thus, long-arm statutes, the implementing device of
International Shoe, have been in a constant state of tension with the
principle of International Shoe itself. This tension has lead to an
incoherent distortion of the rules stated in that opinion, either along the
lines of trying to make the statute such an incredibly lengthy laundry list
of forecasts as to sink under its own hyper-categorization, as the North
Carolina long-arm statute332 does, or to abdicate the legislative function
entirely by simply, and lazily, incorporating gauzy, difficult to rectify
notions of “due process” as the limit, as California333 and Rhode Island334
famously have done in their long-arm statutes. The right approach is a
twin-aimed one.
329

Id. at 371.
Id. One notable difference is that the authors’ emphasis was on consistency with
the internal logic of International Shoe itself, while Professor Rutherglen seeks an
attractive, but ethereal, focus on “presumptive rules . . . to allocate cases in a way that
fosters interjusidictional cooperation” and a “cooperative approach to personal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 371-72.
331
See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19
(1990); Rutherglen, supra note 296, at 371-73.
332
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (2006) (listing 12 major categories of long-arm
jurisdiction, with numerous sub-categories within them).
333
CAL. CIV. PROC. § 410.10 (2006) (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction
on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”).
334
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33(a) (2007) (bestowing personal jurisdiction in Rhode
Island courts over non-resident defendants “in every case not contrary to the provisions
of the constitution or laws of the United States”).
330
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First, we must return to International Shoe for a close reading of
the jurisdictional rules set out there, and to use those rules—and their
vocabulary and concepts, rather than those of the Illinois legislature of
the 1950s—to craft the long-arm statutes of the twenty-first century.
Second, we must read International Shoe logically, holistically, and
with metaphoric insight (for jurisdiction is one of the theoretical legal
topics best understood by metaphor),335 to deduce the important
evidentiary presumptions that Chief Justice Stone, most able lawyer and
teacher that he was, instinctively and effortlessly embedded into the
opinion, at such a level of subtlety that even the keenest observers of
procedure in the last 60 years have tended to overlook their significance.
Legislatures whose procedure committees will undertake this twinaimed effort are likely to produce a statute remarkable in at least two
way: [1] that statute will appear alien in light of the received traditions of
long-arm statutes; yet [2] that statute will recast the long-arm as in as
revolutionary a manner as International Shoe recast Pennoyer. Such a
statute is likely to look like the model statute propounded by the authors
here; and such a statute is likely to foster the kind of results that have
compelling integrity, both intellectually and practically.
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See, e.g., Van Detta, The Irony Of Instrumentalism, supra note 189.

